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Introduction

On 6 May 1932 the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives declined to pass along for a full vote in the House a bill that would have
provided for immediate and complete payment of the Soldiers' Bonus, a small sum of
money due in 1945 to veterans of World War I. In doing so it set in motion a chain of
events that led to one of the most sordid affairs in American history, the Bonus March of
1932, when tens of thousands of World War I veterans traveled to Washington to ask
their government for their own money, and ended when the U.S. Army was called out to
forcibly evict them from their shanties on the outskirts of Washington. The perceived
justice of the veterans' cause, certainly as the years went by if not always at the time,
combined with the government's violent response to their passive approach, somehow
made the whole affair seem beneath the dignity of the government and some of the
officials involved.

At the heart of the matter lies the question; what was the

government's obligation to able-bodied veterans home from war? Strongly held and
differing opinions on that question eventually led to violence in the summer of 1932.
In the aftermath of World War I veterans' advocates sought, and in 1924 won, an
adjustment to the extremely low wages earned by the soldiers of that war. With the
power to draft an army the government lacked any incentive to pay soldiers a living
wage, and in the absence of progressive legislation designed to protect soldiers' jobs once
the fighting was over, those same men often had no jobs to return to. Recognizing the
injustice of this, Congress passed the Adjusted Service Compensation Act, which granted
a $1 per day "bonus pay" for each day served during the war, and $1.25 for each day
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served overseas. In order to overcome political opposition to any pay adjustment at all,
proponents had to agree to make the bonus payable in 1945. While unpopular, the
provision was one most veterans could live with until the Great Depression hit them in
1929.

Veterans, like nearly everyone else, suffered immensely from the Great

Depression. Suddenly in desperate economic shape, many veterans were unwilling to
wait until 1945 for money they needed immediately. Out of work and often with families
to feed, many veterans simply couldn't reconcile their present condition with the Bonus
Certificates they possessed, promising payment for service already performed in what
may as well have been some future lifetime. Pressure began to build across the country
to do something to address the veterans' plight.
In the spring of 1932, following the Ways and Means Committee's refusal to
support the Patman Bill, which would have provided for immediate payment of the
bonus, a group of several hundred veterans from Portland, Oregon, set out on a crosscountry trek to Washington, D.C. to demand their money. By the time they reached St.
Louis, word of their journey had spread across the country, encouraging veterans from all
over the country to organize marches on Washington. At its peak, police and military
intelligence estimated the number of veterans in the city at over 20,000, and some
suggested that as many as 80,000 may have participated in the protest at some point. 1
After forcing a Congressional vote on immediate payment of their bonus, and losing in
the Senate, the "Bonus Army" vowed to remain in Washington until 1945, if necessary,
to secure their money. Several weeks later, fearing violence and even revolution, the
1

Walter W. Waters, B.E.F.; The Whole Story Of The Bonus Army (New York, New York:
Stratford Press, 1933 ), p. I.
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Hoover Administration used the U.S. Army to drive the veterans out of the city and their
camps in the surrounding area. Although they had not secured their bonus and been
evicted from the city, the veterans' persistence is credited with getting full payment of the
bonus finally approved in 1936.
The story of the Bonus March of 1932 as a whole has been well examined. The

Bonus March by Roger Daniels and The Bonus Army by Paul Dickson and Thomas B.
Allen are good examples of the scholarship that is available on the Bonus Army today.
Both books employ a historical narrative format to tell the story of the Bonus
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) from a national perspective. The issue of payment of the
bonus is considered as it affected the nation as a whole, and the leadership and decisionmaking processes of both the B.E.F. and the federal government arc examined at the
macro level. Walter W. Waters is the subject of much attention in both books, as he
commanded the B.E.F. in Washington and represented it in discussions with federal
officials. Daniels suggests it was natural to focus on Waters, "the only marcher whose
name was generally known, both inside the scattered B.E.F. and to the public:' 2 George
Patton, Dwight Eisenhower, and Douglas MacArthur receive attention as much for their
future exploits as for the roles they played as mid-level and senior Army officers
responsible for leading the expulsion of the veterans from their camps. 3 Hoover the
President and Hoover the young director of what would later become the Federal Bureau
of Investigation are naturally given prominence, with Herbert coming across as
2

Roger Daniels, The Bonus March: An Episode of the Great Depression, (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1971 ). p. 128.
3
Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen. n1e Bonus Army: An American Epic, (New York, New
York: Walker & Company, 2004), pp.170-183.
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MacArthur's puppet as the latter simply ignored presidential orders and J. Edgar
appearing paranoid when he warned that the veterans planned to blow up the White
House. 4 Of all the main players, only Pelham Glassford, Washington D.C.'s Chief of
Police, is universally praised for his cool-headed management of the crisis, though
ironically he paid for his far-sightedness with his job. 5 In addition, the reader meets
seemingly disinterested third parties who provide the backdrop to the drama that played
itself out all around them, such as Washingtonians Evalyn Walsh McLean, owner of the
Hope Diamond, who famously provided the B.E.F. with gifts of food and money, and
John Henry Bartlett, who provided land for the veterans to encamp upon. 6
As well as employing similar framework, both books are generally sympathetic
toward the veterans, and suggest that national sentiment toward them was generally
positive. While the main opponent of immediate payment was "big business," they imply
that the common man provided the veterans "broad national support."7 Daniels claims
"had there been a national referendum on paying the bonus that spring, it would have
passed easily." Daniels goes on to suggest that "volunteers and donations from all over
the country continued to stream toward Washington" to support the veterans. 8 Further
evidence of national support is offered by Dickson and Allen, who point out that after the
U.S. Army gassed the veterans and evicted them from Washington, a shocked American
public "booed the Army and jeered MacArthur" while watching newsreels of the event. 9

4

Daniels, pp. 170-173; Dickson and Allen, p. 124.
Dickson and Allen, pp. 200-201.
6
Dickson and Allen, pp. 97-99; Daniels, pp. 124-125.
7
Daniels, pp. 36, 113.
8
Daniels, p. 113.
9
Dickson and Allen, p. 193.
5
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Daniels states newspapers across the country "insisted that both national honor and the
people's will called for payment of the bonus." 10 Dickson and Allen claim that President
Hoover "faced a dilemma" in dealing with bonus legislation; Hoover knew paying the
bonus was fiscally irresponsible, but "the bonus was popular." 11 Paul Dickson states that
the country was so desperate for a good news story in the Depression plagued summer of
1932 that newspapers, wire services, newsreel producers, and radio stations across the
country "fell in love" with the Bonus Marchers. 12 Celebrities like Will Rogers, Ernest
Hemmingway, and Evalyn Walsh McLean weighed in at different times in favor of the
veterans' petition. 13
The Bonus March has been thoroughly examined at the national level, but what
about at the state level or even lower?

For example, the B.E.F. was not a single

homogeneous organization, but a collection of myriad groups of veterans that organized
at the town and city level, and only merged into a loose confederation with other
veterans' groups once in Washington. In much of the current research, the B.E.F. is
treated as a single organization and, with the possible exception of the original group
under Walter W. Waters from Oregon, very little attention is devoted to the individual
parts that made up the whole.
The federal government's reaction to the Bonus March is familiar, but each state
that lay on the veterans' path to Washington endured its own little "Bonus March," and

10

Daniels, p. 36.
Dickson and Allen, p. 35.
12
Paul Dickson and Thomas B. Allen, The Bonus Army: An American Epic Webcast, 22 June
2005, Library of Congress, 17 June 2006,
<http://www.loc.gov/today/cyberlc/feature_ wdesc.php?rec=3 71 O>
13
Daniels, pp. 36-37; Dickson and Allen, pp. 97-99, 241-242.
11
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there is precious little scholarship dedicated to the crisis that the individual states suffered
as thousands of indigent men poured across their borders. Whereas existing research
chronicles the actions of the President, the U.S. Army, the Justice Department's Bureau
of Investigation, and the Washington D.C. Police Department, there is a story to be told
that mirrors the federal one at the state level. State governors and their National Guards,
Adjutants General, Departments of Motor Vehicles, and State Police were making
decisions about how to transport, feed, and house veterans from across the country while
maintaining order, not unlike the decisions that are already so well recorded at the federal
level. While authors have narrated and assessed the roles played by men like Waters,
Hoover (Herbert and J. Edgar), Glassford, and MacArthur in national narratives, what
about the roles played by men named Dove, Pollard, Swanson, Glass, Waller, and
Mitchell in Virginia?
The core question that lay at the heart of the entire Bonus March, that of the
obligation of the nation to its veterans, is also tackled at the national level in much of the
current research, with the authors of The Bonus March and The Bonus Army concluding
that the nation, that is the people at large, sympathized with the veterans' cause, even if
the government did not. What is largely omitted is the possibility that entire regions of
the United States might hold a dissenting opinion, and that it is just possible that some
states might strongly oppose the veterans in their bid for their bonus.
The gaps in the current research on the Bonus March can be addressed by
refocusing the narrative on the state and local level, as opposed to the national. Virginia
offers a superb opportunity to apply the methodology reserved so far for the B.E.F. as a
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whole and the federal government to the state level, primarily because of its proximity to
the scene of the final action. Because Virginia borders the District of Columbia, it acted
as a funnel, pouring veterans from across the South and West into Washington, therefore
ensuring Virginia was going to have to grapple with far more veterans than most of the
other states. Further, its proximity to Washington meant that Virginia was bound to be a
player, whether it wanted to be or not, in the ultimate resolution of the crisis. Whether
the Bonus March ended with the veterans receiving their bonus, the authorities crushing
the veterans, or in a violent revolution and the toppling of the federal government,
Virginia was going to have to provide for its own security against whatever might
transpire in Washington in ways that other states obviously did not. Finally, Virginia and
Maryland were the only two ways out of the capital for the veterans and, one way or
another, they were going to have to go home eventually, presenting the state with a last
crisis to manage.
While current research clearly implies that the nation at large supported the
veterans' claim to their bonus, is it possible that Virginia did not concur with the bulk of
the country? Virginia has as proud a military tradition as any state; would it side with the
men who wore the nation's uniform in France in 1917, or the men who wore it in
Washington in 1932, and how would they look upon their own veterans who chose to
participate in the march?

The current research on the Bonus March incorporates

assessments of the performances of federal officials during the Bonus March.
about the performance of Virginia's state officials?

What

How did the Governor and his

subordinates choose to deal with the tidal wave of veterans from out-of-state, and was

8

their response effective? How well did the state government coordinate with county and
city officials throughout Virginia? Did the government have a plan, or was it largely a
spectator, reacting to events seemingly beyond its control? These are fair questions that
federal officials have had to endure, and it may only be right that the same standard be
applied to the state level.
This thesis examines several heretofore neglected angles on the Bonus March: the
participation of Virginian veterans in the Bonus Army, the impact of the march on the
state, the performance of state officials during the crisis, and the opinion of Virginians as
a whole on the merits of the march and the veterans' claim to the bonus. By focusing on
these issues at the state level, rather than the national, one can begin to get an
appreciation for the challenges that all levels of government had to cope with when the
veterans finally rose up and came calling for their money.

Chapter 1: The Invasion of Washington
Walter W. Waters, a World War I veteran from Portland, Oregon was an
unemployed cannery worker in the spring of 1932. Having lost faith in his ability to keep
a job, he began to focus on another route to financial security.

Holding a Bonus

Certificate payable in 1945, he stood up at a veterans rally in March 1932 and suggested
they all march on Washington and demand their money immediately. Few took him
seriously, and nothing came from his suggestion. A month later he again addressed a
gathering of veterans, only to be dismissed a second time. Then in the first week of May
news arrived from Washington that the Patman Bill had failed to clear the Ways and
Means Committee, and the next time Waters suggested a march on Washington veterans
were prepared to listen. By mid-month 300 veterans were prepared to follow Waters to
Washington, forming the core of what would become the Bonus Expeditionary Force.
Organizing in military fashion, Waters was eventually elected Regimental Commander,
and subordinate commanders were appointed. Buglers and first aid teams were assigned
to "companies," military police were empowered to maintain discipline, and formations
and marching drills were held. 14 It was a model that was to be copied by Bonus Marchers
from across the country in the weeks that followed.
Waters' two primary problems as his 300 men set off for Washington were food
and transportation.

The first he solved through requesting donations from towns he

passed through, often sending parties ahead of the main body to solicit provisions before
they arrived. For the second he took to the rails. In the America of the 1930s it was

14

Dickson and Allen, pp. 56-64.
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common for people to hop a ride on a freight train. Before the automobile became
commonplace, it was the only way for many who couldn't afford regular tickets to travel
long distance, and the railroads for the most part looked the other way. 15 Moving 300
men across the country on freight trains was not the same as moving one or two at a time;
though, and the group had mixed results, sometimes getting full cooperation from the
railroads, other times having to block trains from departing entirely to get on board. In
this manner they worked their way to St. Louis, and from there into the national headlines
and consciousness.
In East St. Louis, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad finally stood its ground and
informed Waters that the veterans would not be permitted to ride its trains free of charge.
A standoff ensued during which the veterans refused to allow any eastbound train to
leave town without them aboard, and the railroad responded by rerouting traffic around
St. Louis to avoid the veterans. Local authorities feared violence, and Governor Louis
Lincoln Emmerson of Illinois responded by calling out the National Guard, not to arrest
the veterans, but to provide them transportation by truck across his state, thereby
preventing violence in Illinois by passing the veterans off to Indiana. Indiana followed
suit, and soon all the governors were transporting the veterans through their states,
happily passing o.ff the problem, they reasoned, to the city that created it in the first
place. 16 When the veterans' standoff with the railroad and authorities in Illinois was
picked up by the national media, it ignited spontaneous Bonus Marches by veterans from

15
16

Dickson and Allen, pp. 64-65.
Daniels, pp. 81-82.
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cities across the country, all converging on Washington to demand immediate payment of
the Soldiers' Bonus. 17
Pelham D. Glassford had been the Chief of the Washington, D.C. Police
Department less than a year when veterans from around the country began arriving in
May of 1932. As he scanned news reports and plotted the position of Bonus Marchers on
a map of the United States, Glassford began to develop a sense of the scale of the thing
that was about to descend on his city. A retired Army Brigadier General and World War I
veteran himself, he may have understood better than most how best to handle his fellow
veterans. Glassford immediately determined that it was in the government's interest to
help the veterans conduct an orderly protest, rather than oppose them, and set about
planning where to house the veterans and how to feed them. When his superiors from the
District's government suggested his policy would simply encourage additional veterans
to come to the city, Glassford retorted that he'd rather have 10,000 orderly protesters than
half as many rioters. 18 He focused on a row of dilapidated buildings that dated from the
Civil War located on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Capital.
These buildings were abandoned and scheduled for demolition, clearing the way for a
new series of buildings belonging to the federal government in what would form the
Federal Triangle .. Glassford sought and received the permission of the developers, then
the City of Washington, to house the veterans in those buildings temporarily. As the
B.E.F. expanded Glassford wanted to settle additional veterans on the outskirts of
Washington. In addition to a number of other small areas around the city that would
17
18

Dickson and Allen, p. 73.
Dickson and Allen, p. 76.
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become \'eterans' camps. he 5\.-cun:d from one donor a 30-acre plot of prirnte property in

S.W. Washington which was named Camp Bartlett. nller the O\\ner. which e\'entually
became the home of Virginia's \'eterans during the Bonus ~larch. 19 In addition to small
sites in and around the city. Glassford looked across the ri\'er to a much larger location at
Anacostia Flats. which would bc.-come the main camp for the B.E.F. in the summer of
1932.
Anacostia Flats was located on the south bank of the Anacostin Ri\'er in the
southeast corner of the District of Columbia. and was under the control of the Office of
Public Buildings and Public Parks. By the first week of June Glassford had secured
permission for its use. and the first of what would become tholL-.ands of \'Cler.ms mo\'cd
in and began to build makeshift quarters for themsel\'es. and sometimes their entire
families. Imitating a phenomenon taking place across the entire country. Anacostia was
to become one of the largest and certainly best kno\\TI 1loo\'er\'illes in the nation. a
collection of makes hi ft shacks which ser\'ed as homes for many ''ho otherwise had none.
By the middle of June 1932. nearly 25.000 \'eterans were in and around Washington. with
the largest single group stuffed into Camps

~larks

and Sims at Anacostia.

Although Glassford was busy making preparations to recei\'c tens of thousands of
\'eterans. he was hoping he might be able to limit their number to something more
manageable. but to do that he needed help. To that end. he sent his first telegram to
Virginia Go\'ernor John G. Pollard on 23

~fay

1932. In it. Glassford asked Pollard to do

what he could to limit the number of \'eterans tra\'clling to Washington through his state.

1
•

Daniels. pp. I:!-'. l.:!6. l-17.
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Specifically, Glassford requested that Pollard not transport veterans through Virginia
with government vehicles as so many other governors were doing, and if he did, to
impress upon the veterans that they were not to stay in Washington longer than 48 hours,
at which time Virginia would also provide transportation out of the capital. In short, if
Pollard transported the veterans to Washington, Glassford wanted him to take some
responsibility for them. 20 Pollard did not respond, so Glassford followed up with a
second telegram four days later, and a letter four
days after that. After his third attempt in just over
a week to secure some assistance from the
Governor of Virginia, Pollard finally responded
by passing the matter to the Virginia Department
of the American Legion, though he offered Glenn
Elliot of that office no guidance on how he was to
proceed on the matter.

He further assured

Glassford that he had seen "no evidence of the

Figure 1:
Virginia Governor
John G. Pollard.

movement (of veterans) and there has as yet been no occasion for any action," and invited
Glassford to contact him again if there should be any "movement' in the future and the
Chief of Police should like his help. 21
The Governor's reply was probably more than Glassford could stand. If Pollard
hadn't seen any movement of veterans in his own state it would only be another three
20

Pelham D. Glassford to John G. Pollard, 23 May 1932, Governors Papers Collection, Library of

21

John G. Pollard to Pelham D. Glassford, 2 June 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of

Virginia.
Virginia.
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days before he would, and even so news reports pouring in from cities across the country
should have alerted Pollard to what was coming just as they had alerted Glassford.
Further, Pollard was never going to have the luxury of simply passing the veterans on to
Washington and making them that city's problem the way, say, the Governor of Illinois
did. Washington's problem was going to be Virginia's problem, if for no other reason
than simple geography. While Glassford recognized this and reached out to Pollard, the
Governor seemingly kept his head in the sand, content to react to events rather than
getting out in front of them. It is not difficult to picture Glassford throwing up his hands
in frustration to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, for whom he
worked, ranting that he could get no help from the Commonwealth of Virginia. It must
have come to something like that, because on 9 June the Commissioners sent their own
telegram to Governor Pollard adding their voices to their Police Chief's, reiterating the
challenges the District was facing with so many veterans already present or on the way,
and again asking for Pollard's help to stem the tide of men advancing through his state. 22
Pollard answered their three-page plea with a two-sentence reply that simply stated that
he had received their telegram and would continue to cooperate.

23

The Commissioners

must have wondered what cooperation he was referring to, since by that time they would
have known that_ local authorities in Charlottesville, Danville, and Lynchburg were all
providing transportation to veterans en route to Washington, contrary to the numerous
requests of Washington authorities. In any case they gave up hope of getting relief from

22

Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to John G. Pollard, 9 June 1932,
Governor's Papers Collection, Library of Virginia.
23
John G. Pollard to the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 10 June 1932,
Governor's Papers Collection, Library of Virginia.
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the south. and the authorities in Washington wouldn't engage Go\'emor Pollard again
until it was time to think about what to do with the B.E.F. as it left Washington.
whenever that might be.

Chapter 2: The Boys from Virginia

Once the B.E.F. settled into its designated camps, Walter Waters began to work
on the issue at hand - securing their bonus. He needed 145 Congressmen's signatures on
a petition to pull the Patman Bill out of committee and put it to a full vote on the House
floor. The bill would then have to go through two votes in the House. The first would be
on whether or not to schedule the bill for a full vote, effectively overruling the Ways and
Means Committee. If that was successful, the second would be on the bill itself. While
their men milled about the streets of Washington, leaders of the B.E.F. worked the halls
of Congress, petitioning Congressmen for the required signatures. It took only a couple
days to find 145 sympathetic lawmakers, significantly only one of whom was from
Virginia, and on 13 June a majority of Representatives voted in favor of putting the bill to
the House for a vote. 24 In the first indication that Virginia might think very differently
than the nation at large, Virginia's Representatives voted one for, one absent, and eight
against sending the bill to the floor for a vote. Speaking for the Virginian majority,
Representative Clifton A. Woodrum expressed some of their reasons for voting against
the bill including fear of inflating the currency, thereby setting back economic recovery
for everyone, and suggested that Virginia's veterans needed no special help as they were
already scheduled that year to get a new veterans' hospital. 25 Agreeing completely with
his position, the Roanoke Times suggested that Woodrum's reasons for opposing the bill
were sound "and will commend themselves to the judgment of the voters of the

24
25

Dickson and Allen, pp. 89-102.
"Woodrum Votes Against Bonus," Roanoke Times, 15 June 1932, p. 3.
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6th

17

District.''

26

Ne\'erthelcss. the Patman Bill ad\'anced to a full rnte in the I louse scheduled

for 15 June. where the result was expected to be the same as the 13 111 • While Virginia·s
press was initially no help to the \'eterans. on the day of that first \'Ole in the I louse
Virginia lent the Bonus Anny a different kind of support. On the morning of 8 June the
first 25 \'eterans from Virginia had arri\'ed in Washington to join the B.E.F.
Petersburg was the first community in Virginia to mobilize in support of the
Bonus March. Ha\'ing watched a small group of Floridians pass through town on 4 June
before stopping in Richmond. Petersburg·s \·eterans organizi:d and were gone before the
local press caught wind of them. On the morning of 6 June two automobiles were seen
driving through town with a banner reading .. Petersburg to \\'ashington .. draped across
their sides.

27

Although reporters attempted to disco\'er the names of the \'cterans within.

they were gone too quickly.

A day later they were seen in Fredericksburg. where

reporters put their number at 25.~

8

Fortunately Richmond"s \'eterans took a little longer

to organize than Petersburg·s. and therefore ga\'e the Richmond press a chance to lca\'c a
more detailed account of their enterprise.
The spontaneous nature of the Bonus ~tarch caught Richmond"s \'eterans
unaware. Nobody had em·isioned a national effort. nobody was prepared. and Virginia's
veterans were running late if they wanted to get to the capital in time for the \'Ote in the
House.

A couple of Richmond \·eterans. Joe Williams and J.F. Joinville. began to

-

-

organize veterans in that citv,,, bv,,, announcing..... the creation of a Richmond continl.!ent of the

6

The Correct Position:· Rnannk.: Timc:s. 15 June 1932. p. -l.
Bonus Band Passes Herc:· l'c:tc:rshurg l'rogrc:.u-lndc:x. 6 June 1932. p. I.
:s .. Bonus ~!archers Ride Through City:· Frc:dc:rickshurg Frei: l.ancl'-Star. 8 June 1932. p. I.
:

:
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B.E.F.

Williams posted banners in business and residential districts, in addition to

driving trucks through town with banners on the side announcing a planning session to be
held on 10 June. Joinville began to work out transportation to Washington for what he
estimated would be a 200-man group. Events in Washington were beginning to dictate a
compressed timeline to Williams and Joinville.

The House of Representatives was

scheduled to begin debate on immediate payment of the bonus on 13 June, and if they
were going to get to Washington in time to be there for a possible vote, they needed to be
on the road by the 11 th. 29 Perhaps because there was so little time to prepare, Williams
seems to have focused his recruiting efforts primarily on Richmond, as there is no
evidence that he reached out to surrounding communities in Virginia.

Figure 2: Bonus Marchers from Richmond prepare to depart/or Washington.
On Friday night, 10 June, more than 200 World War I veterans met at the Labor
Temple on 11th and Marshall Streets in Richmond to organize the Richmond contingent
of the B.E.F.

29

Assembled by Williams and Joinville, the veterans quickly organized

"Richmonders Plan March," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 8 June 1932, p. 3.
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themselves along military lines, and selected Thomas B. Dove, a veteran of the 4th
Division during the war, as their commander. Additional leadership posts went to J.K.
Sullivan, C.C. Grotz, and B.E. Chalkley. It is not clear why Dove was selected ahead of
the others for the position of commander, as he was not one of the gentlemen who
organized the meeting in the first place, and seemed to demonstrate no special leadership
qualities at the meeting. While Sullivan, Joinville, Williams, and an official from the
Richmond office of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (V.F.W.) addressed the assembled
veterans on the importance of good behavior and military discipline, no record exists of
any substantial address made by Dove. Nevertheless, Dove chose his staff and on the
morning of the 11th the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F. set out to join the main body
in Washington.
J.F. Joinville had been tasked with the responsibility of arranging transport for the
entire group to Washington, and he was under the impression that he had obtained
approval from the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad for the use of two
box cars on 11 June from Richmond to Washington. When the 200 men of the Richmond
B.E.F. arrived at the rail yard, however, they were told they would not be allowed free
use of the railroad. Although the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad had
already made a regular habit of allowing veterans from outside Virginia free passage on
its trains through the state, they declined to offer the same hospitality to Virginia's own

°

veterans. 3 Faced with this unanticipated roadblock, the Richmond B.E.F. began to come
apart before it even left the city. Nearly half of the veterans quit the enterprise right then
30
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and there, sufficiently dejected by the train episode that they decided to simply go home.
The other half stuck it out, and after a full night of negotiating with the railroad and
looking for truck transportation, just over 100 veterans were permitted to board a
northbound train early on the morning of the 12th. 31 By that afternoon they were outside
Alexandria encamped in an abandoned gas station, and later moved to the barn of an
abandoned

electric

train

line.

Richmond

merchants had already sent provisions north to
support their

veterans,

and

local

residents

provided large donations of food and coffee. At 5
A.M. on the morning of 13th, the 100 men of the
Richmond B.E.F. set out on foot for Washington

Figure 3: The leaders of the
Richmond contingent. From left
to right; Thomas B. Dove, C. C.
Grotz, and B.E. Chalkley.

and settled into camp near Congress Heights in
the

extreme

southeast

of the

District

of

Columbia. 32

While they didn't make any special effort to recruit from outside the city of
Richmond before they departed for Washington, the leaders of the Richmond contingent
must have hoped to add to their number along the way. If they did they may have been
disappointed, be".ause Fredericksburg, the largest city on their route, produced only a
handful of additional veterans. Harry Ridge, formerly of the United States Marine Corps
(U.S.M.C.), spread the word throughout town that any veterans wishing to join the B.E.F.
31
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in Washington should gather in front of the Fredericksburg courthouse at 2 P.M. on 11
June, reasoning that they "might as well starve in Washington as starve in
Fredericksburg." 33 From there he had no idea whatsoever how to get to Washington, so
the following day the small number of veterans who had answered his call were seen
loitering around town looking for a ride to the capital. Upon hearing that the Richmond
contingent was leaving Richmond that day, Ridge decided to join that group as it passed
through Fredericksburg, and by 13 June they were at Congress Heights with the rest of
the Virginians. 34 One Fredericksburg veteran is an interesting case because, unlike many
or maybe even most of the men who left home to march on the capital, E.R. Lewis quit a
job to join the B.E.F. Lewis was employed by the Battlefield Park Commission until he
simply stopped showing up for work on 3 June. His supervisor later discovered that
Lewis had reported to the commission's main office to collect his last two weeks' pay of
$24 and gone north to join the Bonus March on his own. Although he was only earning
about $2 a day, Lewis represented veterans who felt strongly enough about their bonus
that they would leave work that many would have been glad to have at the time. In
addition to leaving steady employment, Lewis was one of the many veterans who brought
his wife with him, adding an additional dimension to the Bonus March. 35
There is evidence of only one other community in Virginia attempting to organize
an independent contingent of Bonus Marchers. In Charlottesville, former Sergeant W.T.
Calder announced that he had organized 60 veterans to join the B.E.F., and expected up
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to 200 to join him by 16 June.

Calder planned to advance to Washington through

Gordonsville, Orange, and Fredericksburg, picking up as many veterans as he could
along the way. The Daily Progress immediately condemned the idea, expressing its hope
that the veterans of their city would reconsider heckling a weak Congress into doing
something that would hurt the nation's economy, and concluded by admonishing the
veterans that "these are not methods of citizen or soldier."36 In any case, it is likely that
the Charlottesville contingent never got off the ground, as there is no further mention of it
in any of Virginia's newspapers studied. Calder made his announcement on 14 June, and
didn't plan to depart until 16 June at the very earliest. By then the Senate was already
debating the Patman Bill and on 18 June voted it down. As Charlottesville was already
so late in organizing, it is likely that when word reached the assembling veterans that the
Patman Bill had died in the Senate they simply didn't continue, at least not as an
organized group. If any local veterans did travel to Washington they probably did it in
small groups or individually, hitching on with the hundreds of out-of-state veterans
passing through Charlottesville, and merging with the Richmond B.E.F. in Washington if
they could find it.
Who were these Virginians who felt strongly enough about their right to
immediate payment of their bonus that they traveled to Washington to join the Bonus
Expeditionary Force? Very little information is available about them individually. There
are seemingly no published interviews with Virginian Bonus Marchers in the years after
the event, and most newspaper accounts from 1932 offer little biography of their leaders.
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The Richmond contingent commander, Thomas B. Dove, served with the 58th Infantry of
the 4th Division during the war, W.T. Calder was a sergeant with the 29th Infantry
Division, 37 and Harry Ridge served in the U.S.M.C. But service information about the
rest of the leaders is not available. In 1919 Virginia established the Virginia War History
Commission, charged with documenting Virginia's contribution to World War I. The
commission passed voluntary surveys to each of Virginia's nearly 80,000 World War I
veterans, only 15,000 of whom bothered to fill it out and return it.

Of the eleven

Virginian B.E.F. leaders mentioned in newspaper accounts by name, not one filled out his
survey. 38 In addition, military records for all eleven were destroyed in a 1973 fire at the
National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis which consumed 80 percent of all service
members' records who were discharged between 1912 and 1960.39
What we can surmise about them is that they must have been an especially
determined group, at least the ones who stuck it out through the failure to get a train on
the first day. Of the highest estimate of 25,000 veterans who occupied the capital, reports
never place the strength of the Richmond B.E.F. at more than 300, with scattered
individuals from around the state swelling their numbers slightly. 40 Walter Waters was
later able to produce roster sheets of the B.E.F. that listed 259 Virginians, placing
Virginia 26th among the states in terms of number of veterans who participated in the
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Bonus March. 41

Waters claimed he had lost about half his roster sheets, so if one

assumes the lost sheets were spread evenly across the entire B.E.F. and not limited to
veterans from any one state (perhaps a bit of a stretch), the total number of Virginias who
participated in the Bonus March at some point may have been a little over 500.
Assuming then a top strength of 300 at any one time, Virginia's contribution to the
overall B.E.F. represented about 1.2 percent of its total, and only 0.4 percent of Virginia's
World War I veterans. Given these small numbers, these men must have represented the
most hard-core proponents of immediate payment of the bonus, with the vast majority of
Virginia's World War I veterans choosing to stay at home rather than journey to
Washington.

41

Waters, p. 258.

Chapter 3: "Virginia Regrets"

While Virginian merchants and private citizens provided the Richmond B.E.F.
with food, landowners looked the other way when their fields were used for sleep or
abandoned buildings used for shelter, government officials coordinated with relief
agencies for provisions, and railway officials eventually allowed them passage on their
trains, not all Virginians were solidly behind the veterans' cause. The editorial boards of
Virginian newspapers could be brutal in their contempt for the Bonus Marchers, and were
unsupportive when Virginians joined the B.E.F. in Washington. Upon learning that some
of Richmond's own were going to join the B.E.F., the Richmond News Leader best
summarized the opinion of the state's press:
Virginia had heretofore observed a reasonable attitude toward a policy which ...
will bankrupt the treasury. Nowhere have a larger percentage of ex-servicemen
opposed bonus legislation. Most Virginians veterans felt that they could well
emulate their fathers and grandfathers who, after four years of the direst hardships
that war has ever brought on a people, were content to live in the memory of duty
done. We are sorry this record is marred by this futile march. 42
This begs the question; why did so many oppose payment of the Soldiers' Bonus as
strongly as they did? What were the arguments Virginia's press used in opposition to the
bonus?
In editorial sections studied from fourteen Virginian newspapers in the summer of
1932, ranging from large city daily papers to small county weeklies, from every
geographical area of the state, and from before the veterans appeared in Washington until
after their camps were nothing but smoldering ashes, not a single one was ever supportive
of immediate payment of the Soldiers' Bonus. Every one of them remained firmly and
42
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consistently opposed to the veterans' cause throughout the Bonus March.

In their

editorial sections, they stated a number of reasons for opposing early payment of the
bonus. First, there was the question of whether an able bodied veteran of war was
entitled to compensation in any form. None of
the papers denied that wounded veterans or the
families of deceased soldiers must be taken care
of, but the Richmond Times-Dispatch called
attention to the fact that those veterans who were
not wounded in the war had no claim to a bonus
of any sort, as they were chosen for military
service precisely because they represented the
fittest among them, were still under 40 years of
age, were stronger than most of their fellow
citizens, and therefore had no excuse for not
scrapmg out some kind of a living. 43

Figure 4: "How Times Have
Changed! " One paper regrets that
Americans
are
looking
to
Washington where they once looked
only to themselves.

The Petersburg Progress-Index agreed, and

supported its position with an analysis of the support provided to veterans by each of the
belligerent powers of World War I concluding that, by the standards of the rest of the
world, the American system was relatively generous. No other nation offered ablebodied veterans a lump-sum payment of any kind.

Instead, they provided pension

systems that only aided "those partly or wholly disabled in the war and to the dependents
of those who died in service. ' While the paper stopped short of calling American war
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veterans greedy vis-a-vis their former allies and foes, it did note "the idea of a bonus for
military service in the World War is distinctly American."44 By the following week the
Progress-Index had read its history and noted that this was not the first time American

soldiers marched upon their government demanding money in the wake of a war.
Supporting its earlier thesis that the idea of cash bonuses for able-bodied veterans was a
uniquely American idea, the paper cited examples of past clashes between the
government and its veterans over money, and proudly noted that the government had not
previously caved to the demands of its veterans, implying nor should it do so in the
present crisis. 45
The suffering of so many people as a result of the Great Depression weighed
heavily on the minds of some who couldn't understand why veterans should receive more
assistance than their countrymen. The Waverly Dispatch in Sussex thought that the
veterans would have acquitted themselves better by going to Washington to propose "a
new economic deal" for all the country's unemployed, using that exact term only a year
before President Roosevelt made it famous, rather than seeking quick cash for
themselves. 46 The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot concurred when it stated "the nation can not,
in fairness to millions in no better case, further this quest.'.4 7 The Daily Progress in
Charlottesville would see any available funds spent on relief or charity, and was certain
that paying the bonus represented neither, calling it "more like trading with the enemy."48
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Also thinking about the nation as a whole, the Lynchburg Daily Advance called
immediate payment of the bonus an "obstacle ... placed in the way of an improvement in
the economic and financial situation."49

The Roanoke Times opposed inflating the

currency, as the government would surely have to do in order to pay the bonus, thereby
damaging the credit of the United States and postponing a return to prosperity for
everyone. 50

The Alexandria Gazette agreed, going a step further to point out the

disastrous historical examples of inflation and hyper-inflation caused by printing extra
money in the Confederate States of America and post-World War l Germany and
Russia. 51 In an era when balancing the federal budget was actually taken seriously, the

Norfolk Ledger-Dispatch wondered if the veterans thought the government had some
"magic method" of raising funds and, assuring them that it did not, suggested that the
country simply couldn't afford to pay the bonus at this time. 52 The Danville Register
hoped the government would hold firm as well, claiming it had just balanced the budget,
would undermine its recent good work by paying the bonus, and would undoubtedly
"precipitate ... another financial crisis" should it do so. 53 Following a speech to veterans
in which retired U.S. Marine Corps General Smedley D. Butler told them to stick to their
guns, that they are better than their fellow citizens, the Alexandria Gazette made clear
that we had no military aristocracy in this country, that veterans are no different than
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anyone else, and a very legitimate reason for opposing immediate payment of the bonus
would be "the fear of military domination in this country." 54
There were counterarguments to each of the above positions to be sure.
Proponents of immediate payment of the bonus would claim that inflating the currency
would only put extra dollars in the pockets of businessmen, stimulating an economy that
needed it desperately. 55 Veterans might agree that many of them returned unharmed, but
would argue that their wartime salary was about 1/20th that of a typical dockworker who
stayed home, and they should not have been financially penalized for answering their
nation's call. 56 Claims that the country simply couldn't afford the bonus might be met
with the disdain that Will Rogers showed when he claimed that was "applesauce," that
the country was not broke, and if it was how was it that automobile manufacturers were
months behind in their orders? 57 However valid some of these arguments may have been,
the fact is that the news media in Virginia didn't make or support a single one of them,
holding firm throughout the summer of 1932 that not only was there no compelling
reason to pay the bonus, but there were actually quite a lot of reasons for not giving the
veterans a dime.
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Chapter 4: Southern Hospitality

Bordering the District of Columbia as it does, Virginia had a unique opportunity
to host veterans from all across the South and West en route to the capital. Arriving in
only a trickle at first, by mid-June some towns had already handled several thousand
veterans passing through. Traveling Bonus Marchers found that there were sometimes
two Virginias waiting for them; one that went out of its way to extend a helping hand,
and another that could be cold and uninviting, making it perfectly clear that the veterans
were not always welcome.
Virginians didn't fully understand the scale of the impending Bonus March when
the first 44 members of the Florida contingent arrived in Richmond on 5 June, with 150
more expected the next day.

They were met with food and places to sleep by the

Salvation Army and the Volunteers of America, arranged for by Richmond Captain of
Detectives A.S. Wright. 58 Stories oflocal hospitality abounded in Virginia's newspapers,
especially in the early days of the Bonus March. The day after Detective Wright met the
first Floridians with food and accommodations, a follow-on contingent from the Florida
group told a Richmond reporter about a former German soldier, employed now in the
United States as a railroad worker, who provided the veterans with sandwiches and coffee
at his own expense. 59 In Charlottesville 2,500 Bonus Marchers from the western states
moved through the city in the first two weeks of June. Most of the marchers had been
moved to Charlottesville from Roanoke through Lynchburg, with transportation provided
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by each of those cities to the next in the line. Charlottesville Chief of Police Maurice F.
Greaver set veterans up at the local National Guard Armory, moving groups as large as
600 per day through town after a night of sleep and a meal on the city. 60 By mid-July
Greaver had handled nearly 4,000 veterans in this manner with hardly an incident,
prompting the commander of an outfit from South Carolina to write a letter to the Chief
thanking him for "the courteousness shown us during our need by your kind and public
spirited officers." 61 Commenting on Virginia's hospitality, one group from Wisconsin
reported "Richmonders ... have been very kind to us. We stopped in several grocery
stores ... and were not refused food a single time." 62 As late as 18 July Richmond was
providing so much food for traveling Bonus Marchers that a group of 35, the last group to
leave Richmond before the Army routed the marchers out of Anacostia, claimed they
were reluctant to leave the city, as they had eaten well there and didn't know if they
would do so in Washington. 63 In Danville the leader of a group of 23 veterans from
Florida noted that city was the single most hospitable town they had encountered on their
entire trip. Having become separated from their main group, the 23 men were given food
and fuel by the Danville Police Department before continuing north.
effectively with much larger groups as well.
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Danville coped

Adding to the number of veterans

Lynchburg was. already receiving from Roanoke, Danville began sending hundreds of
veterans to Lynchburg in the first week of June. The first large group of200 veterans had
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been dropped at the city limits by trucks from Greensboro, North Carolina, on the
evening of 6 June, and within two hours the city had rounded up enough trucks to ship
the men on to the small town of Gretna, whose mayor telephoned the Danville Police
Department to object, stating that Gretna simply didn't have the ability to deal with such
a large group. Danville Mayor Harry Wooding relented, and Danville picked up the
additional cost of moving the veterans through Gretna and on to Lynchburg. 65
Truckloads of veterans continued through Danville over the next week, nearly all of
which followed the same route from Danville to Lynchburg, then on to Charlottesville
and finally Washington.
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Veterans from Virginia

-

Veterans from the South and West

-

,,_

Confrontations with local authorities

From Bristol,
TN

From Greensboro,

From Fayetteville,

NC
NC
Figure 5: Major routes traveled through Virginia by veterans; June-July 1932.
Many groups of veterans did not impose on local communities for food, shelter,
and transportation. On 9 June one such group of 200 veterans from Georgia moved
through Petersburg in seven large trucks and, other than needing to buy gasoline, were
"plentifully supplied with provisions" of their own. After obtaining their gasoline and
65
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spending the night in Petersburg, the group made camp in Colonial Heights just across
the Appomattox River, where they cooked their breakfast over open fires and were off to
Washington by that afternoon. 66 One veteran, who hadn't imposed on a single person for
charity between his home in Indiana and Virginia, suddenly needed help when he reached
Winchester.

In what was surely a humorous episode for everyone but him, Vernon

Spencer burned every dollar he had when he disposed of an old pair of trousers, pockets
stuffed with cash, in a camp fire. He turned to social workers in that town to get him the
rest of the way to Washington. 67
Not everyone welcomed veterans on their way through Virginia, and chief among
them were the railroads, which fought all summer to keep veterans off their trains
whenever possible. In one example of a cat and mouse game taking place across the
state, a group of 206 veterans was stranded in Culpepper when the train crew released the
cars that they were riding in.

The train crew reported that the railroad had issued

instructions to them not to carry veterans over the border into the District of Columbia.
Some of the men asserted it was the third time they'd been thrown off a train since they
left their homes in South Carolina and Georgia. 68 As mentioned earlier, Virginia's own
veterans from Richmond were initially thwarted in their attempt to travel to Washington
by train. Besides the nuisance the veterans represented, railroads needed to discourage
veterans from hopping free rides for safety reasons. In a tragic example of rail mishaps
probably taking place across the country, Charles Jacobsen, a Bonus Marcher from
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Dansbury, Iowa, was struck by a train in Richmond when he fell asleep on the tracks, of
all places. He was critically injured and was not expected to survive. 69
In addition to the railroads, transient veterans began to encounter resistance from
local communities in Virginia as the Bonus March wore on. Lynchburg was the first to
take a stand against Bonus Marchers traveling through town. While Lynchburg initially
provided transportation for 600 men and fed 500 of them, the City Council voted on 13
June that no further support would be provided to veterans. Calling the veterans' stay in
Lynchburg a "hold up," the Council determined that from that point forward the entire
city police force in conjunction with the National Guard would be used to force veterans
to move on. 70 In Richmond veterans complained that police officers were squeezing
them for $1 fines, citing vagrancy laws that didn't even exist. 71 In Roanoke the service
officer of Blue Ridge Post 484 of the V.F.W. announced that, as his committee had all it
could handle just providing food for needy Roanoke veterans, it would not provide free
meals to Bonus Marchers en route to Washington. At a subsequent meeting of the Post
484 leadership the service officer was overruled, but no doubt many hungry veterans had
passed through the city by then without the benefit of a meal from the V.F.W.
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City

officials in Roanoke were determined to keep veterans from coming to the city at all, but
were quickly overwhelmed by sheer numbers. After a tip from officials in Bristol warned
that a large group of veterans was en route from that city, Roanoke City Manager W.P.
Hunter determined to meet the veterans outside the city limits to steer them to another
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place. A veteran on the first truck he encountered informed Hunter that there were 450
men en route behind him who could be expected shortly, and by 10 June there were over
500 veterans in Roanoke. Unable to keep them out of the city, Hunter was compelled to
house them in the City Auditorium. 73 Officials authorized the purchase of enough food
for two meals, and then tackled the problem of getting rid of them. Showing, according
to the Roanoke Times, "no more intelligence" than authorities in neighboring cities, the
City Council "passed the buck" to Lynchburg, perpetuating what the Times called "a
sorry mess."74 When estimates from railroad companies to move the veterans came in
higher than expected, the city decided to pay $205 to a trucking company to move them
on to Lynchburg, and then announced it would take no further steps to assist any more
Bonus Marchers. 75
Residents of Fredericksburg had relatively little interaction with veterans as they
passed through on their way to Washington.

Observing that the veterans had been

traveling through town for several days in the first week of June, the Free Lance-Star
reported that only a single group of 100 had actually stayed overnight in Fredericksburg,
and that they had been well behaved. 76 Although the city was able to avoid providing
transportation and other services to the Bonus Marchers as they made their way to the
capital, in the first days of the Bonus March Fredericksburg had the opposite experience
of wrestling with veterans on their way out of, rather than towards, Washington. As early
as 9 June people began to notice disgruntled veterans traveling in the opposite direction,

"Veterans on Way to Capital Spend Night in Roanoke," Roanoke Times, 11June1932, p. 1.
"Our Recent Guests," Roanoke Times, 12 June 1932, p. 4.
75 "Second Contingent of Vets Sent On Way To Washington," Roanoke Times, 13 June 1932, p. 1.
76 Fredericksburg Free Lance-Star, 7 June 1932, p. 1.
73

74

36

already despairing of ever receiving their bonus and returning home. 77 Many feared they
were merely the first in what might be an avalanche of angry men stranded in their area
when the Bonus March collapsed, and were immediately nearly proven right.

In

Washington, the District Commissioners' first plan to bring the Bonus March to a
peaceful conclusion was simply to load the men up on trucks, drive them 50 miles outside
of town, and dump them, a plan that the Free Lance-Star noted would place the bulk of
the B.E.F. right in Fredericksburg. 78 A week later Washington authorities did just that,
using three District of Columbia garbage trucks to drop off 47 men in front of the town
courthouse. Their arrival was completely unannounced, and City Manager L.J. Houston
quickly arranged for two southbound trucks to haul the veterans to North Carolina, at the
small cost of $10. 79

That was the only group of veterans unilaterally shipped to

Fredericksburg, but the fear of mass lawlessness from an army of unemployed men in
their midst continued to hang over Northern Virginia for the duration of the Bonus
March.
Despite the cold reception they sometimes received, the veterans who passed
through Virginia were generally well behaved, belying the fears of many law
enforcement officials who expected the worst.

The Richmond Times-Dispatch

editorialized that it was "called upon to applaud the cool-headedness displayed thus far
by the 'B.E.F.'," and local officials often commented on the good conduct of veterans,
such as when police officers in Lynchburg reported that one group of veterans passing
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through was "unusually quiet despite rumors of disorder along the way." 80 Virginia State
Adjutant-General S. Gardner Waller commented that the veterans were well behaved and
that "their discipline had been of a semi-military nature." 81 Commenting on "our recent
guests," the Roanoke Times called the conduct of 500 traveling Bonus Marchers
"exemplary and beyond criticism. Aside from . . . feeding and transporting them . . .
Roanoke had no cause to complain of their presence." 82 There were, however, examples
of troublemakers as well. One veteran "went berserk" in Harrisonburg, was taken into
custody by local police, and stabbed two inmates with a knife while incarcerated. 83 By
20 June Lynchburg had 14 veterans in custody for a variety of offenses, three of whom
attempted to escape and were subsequently assigned to hard labor. 84 In Petersburg, Chief
of Police W.W. Jefferson cautioned residents that men claiming to be veterans were
going door-to-door asking for money to travel to Washington. Jefferson warned that
those men who really were veterans had no authorization to solicit funds in this manner,
while those who were not veterans were using the monies gained for "purposes entirely
different" from those claimed. 85 Despite isolated examples like the above, the overall
conduct of Bonus Marchers in Virginia was orderly and respectful.
A constant theme throughout the unprecedented movement of veterans through
Virginia, men without the means to feed, shelter, or transport themselves, is how

"Communists Thwarted," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 9 June 1932, p. 5; "Lynchburg Aids
Bonus Marchers," Lynchburg Daily Advance, 6 June 1932, p. 1.
81 "Thousands of Bonus Marchers May Be Stranded in Virginia," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 18
80

June 1932, p. 1.
82
Roanoke Times, 12 June 1932, p. 5.
83
Lynchburg Daily Advance, 7 June 1932, p. 1.
.
84 "Ten Bonus Hikers Finish Farm Stay," Lynchburg Dazly Advance, 20 June 1932, p. 2.
85 "Police Warn Against Fake Vet Solicitors," Petersburg Progress-Index, 10 June 1932, p. 1.

38

consistently absent the state government was from the decision-making process. Local
authorities were largely left to develop courses of action and fund their execution entirely
without guidance or assistance from Richmond, despite the fact that authorities in
Washington were begging Governor Pollard to intervene in order to slow the flood of
men descending on the capital. That so many men were transported mostly without
incident in so short a period of time is a testament to the initiative and leadership of a
number of local officials proactively communicating with each other and taking the steps
necessary to preserve order in their communities while weathering the storm that had
rolled in upon them.

Chapter 5: Blacks and Reds
The men of the B.E.F. were not always judged solely on the merits of their cause,
if agreement could even be found as to what their cause was. Tens of thousands of angry
men swarming the nation's capital had a way of bringing out fear, ignorance, and
paranoia in some. In the case of the Bonus Army, Southern fears of racial integration and
national fears of communism combined to take the spotlight off the bonus and put it
squarely on issues that would drain public sympathy from the veterans' cause. The
veterans soon discovered that, where public opinion was concerned, it mattered who you
were and what you thought.
One of the most striking characteristics of the Bonus Army was that, unlike much
of the nation, it was racially integrated. It was unprecedented, spontaneous, and neither
dictated by the force of law nor led by society's elites.

Regular men upended the

conventional wisdom of an entire nation when they crossed racial lines to create the
B.E.F. in pursuit of their bonus. The American Expeditionary Force (A.E.F.) in which
they had served fifteen years earlier had maintained, like much of the nation it served,
that white and black soldiers could not possibly work together; so much so that black
soldiers were actually placed in French units rather than alongside their fellow
Americans. 86 That separation didn't exist in the Bonus Army, where black and white
veterans might be assigned to different squads or platoons, but otherwise marched,
worked, ate, slept, played, and generally lived together.
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Virginia in 1932 was no different than most of the American South, where Jim
Crow "separate but equal" laws were the order of the day. Whites and blacks could not
sit together on public transportation, eat together in a restaurant, live near each other, be
educated in the same schools, or worship in a common church.

The isolation and

marginalization of African-Americans was the overriding goal of Southern elites, and as
long as they could claim it was for everyone's own good, including Southern blacks', Jim
Crow could stand. The basic incompatibility of whites and blacks was the indispensable
"truth" without which Jim Crow collapsed.

Imagine, then, the shock most white

Virginians must have felt at the sight of the racially-integrated Bonus Army traveling
through their state, proving with every step toward Washington the falsehood of so many
assumptions that were the foundation of a segregated society. The spectacle of white and
black veterans traveling, sleeping, and eating side by side while working together towards
a common goal must have been hard for some white Southerners to handle. The Bonus
Army represented a threat to far more than the federal treasury; it stood the entire Jim
Crow notion of "separate but equal" on its head.
Some national observers immediately understood the significance of an integrated
Bonus Army, though sadly, few of them were white. Most prominent among the black
correspondents _was Roy Wilkins from the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.), who was astonished to find the degree to which integration
had taken hold of the veterans at Anacostia. Writing for the N.A.A.C.P.'s magazine

Crisis, Wilkins informed his readers that, in the B.E.F., "Jim Crow was 'absent without

41

leave. "'87 Wilkins went on to make the more dangerous connection between what he was
seeing at Camp Marks and the hypocrisy of contemporary society. Noting that the U.S.
Army in which these veterans had served was still segregated, Wilkins observed how "the
Bonus Marchers gave lie to the notion that black and white soldiers ... couldn't live
together." 88
While the racial component of the Bonus March was not lost on some national
writers, it seemed to be completely invisible to the Virginia media. The only hint of
African-American participation in the Bonus March one will find in any Virginian
newspaper of the day was the occasional observation that "the group included 50
negroes" or some such thing. Not one of Virginia's major newspapers recognized the
significance of the story or, far more likely, they recognized it only too well and
deliberately ignored it because they didn't much care for its implications for their way of
life. After all, if white and black men together could form an effective body to petition

Congress, why couldn't they eat a hamburger together at any Virginia diner? What
Virginia's media didn't proclaim out loud, its private citizens sometimes did. After the
veterans were expelled from Washington, Dorsey Cullen ofUpperville, Virginia, wrote to
Governor Pollard in the hope that the Governor would do everything in his power to
prevent veterans from loitering in the state. Chief among his reasons for wanting the
Bonus Army gone was the following:
While the white men of this organization are not desirable for several reasons,
what is worse still is the fact that there are numerous Negroes among them which
would certainly be a source of anxiety and danger to the people here. Their
87
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presence here would injure the sale of real estate which is generally moving to the
demand of those from other States desiring to locate in this rather select and rich
neighborhood. 89
What is every bit as amazing as the racist rant that Cullen engaged in is the fact that
Governor Pollard, in his reply, declined to censure him for it. Instead, he assured Cullen
that he would do what he could to prevent a "public menace" and asked Cullen to
continue to keep him informed of developments in Upperville. 90 Paul Dickson, co-author
of The Bonus Army, understood the racial tensions that were mostly left unsaid when he
replied to a query about the reason for the cold reception veterans received as they
traveled through Lynchburg by stating that "race may have played some role in the
official reaction." 91

The dichotomy between the integration of the B.E.F. and the

segregation of the society it marched through was simply too great not to make the
probable connection between the veterans' racial integration and the public's hostility to
their cause.
In addition to the racial integration of the B.E.F., Virginians may have been
startled at the sheer number of black veterans marching through the Commonwealth. If
the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F. is even remotely representative of the B.E.F. as a
whole, black veterans may have been far more likely to demand their bonus than their
white counterparts, a fact that would have deeply shaken any support and sympathy that
Virginians would have otherwise had for the veterans' cause.
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While no record of the racial demographics of the Richmond contingent of the
B.E.F. exists, the leadership roles assigned within that group, given the racial climate of
1932 Virginia, allows us to make some educated assumptions about it. Commander
Dove divided his veterans into six squads, three of which were assigned black squad
leaders. 92 That he did so could mean one of two things: either he assigned leaders with
no regard for the race of the men they would lead, or half of the Richmond contingent
was African-American. It is difficult to imagine that Dove would place white men under
the command of black squad leaders, however progressive the Bonus Army may have
seemed to some, so perhaps the Richmonders were about half African-American. Blacks
accounted for 13 percent of the draftees during the World War, roughly corresponding
with their percentage of the population as a whole. 93 In Virginia blacks accounted for 32
percent of the population just before the war, and 28 percent just before the Bonus
March. 94 Assuming then that the percentage of veterans from Virginia who were black
conformed to their percentage in the general population of the state, as it did nationwide,
the fact that Dove split his veterans down the middle on a white/black basis suggests that
African-American veterans, in Virginia at least, were between 60-70 percent more likely
to participate in the Bonus March than their white peers.

Further supporting the

conclusion that black veterans were more likely to demand early payment of their bonus
is the fact that, as of 2 June 1932, only four of 163 posts of the Virginia Chapter of the
American Legion had passed resolutions calling for immediate payment of the bonus, but
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two of the four were described as "colored posts," although only a small percentage of
the 163 total posts could have been "colored," given the minority status of black
Virginians. 95 This inclination most likely represents the disparity of the socio-economic
conditions of white and black America in the midst of the Great Depression, a condition
that is beyond the scope of the current study. Nevertheless, if the trend can be applied to
the veterans marching from across the country (and it probably can given the national
scopes of the Great Depression and African-American socio-economic conditions), the
B.E.F. may have been over 21 percent black, although the American Expeditionary Force
was originally only 13 percent black. Couple these numbers with the exemplary manner
in which the veterans worked side by side for a common cause, and one begins to
understand the unique threat the B.E.F. represented to the racial status quo, particularly in
the South.
Racial composition wasn't the only Bonus Army demographic that was working
against them. Many observers were concerned about the veterans' real or perceived
political views as well. In Washington the conviction was beginning to spread through
the White House, War Department, and other agencies that the Bonus March was nothing
of the sort, but was rather a communist-inspired manipulation and infiltration of a small
number of actual veterans, whose purpose was potentially the toppling of the
government. The Army was especially sensitive to the possibility of a communist plot,
and General Douglass MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, began to pass detailed
intelligence reports to the White House highlighting communist influence in groups of
95 W. Glenn Elliott to John G. Pollard, 2 June 1932, Governor's Papers Collection, Library of
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veterans en route to Washington. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Justice Department's
Bureau of Investigation, contributed to the paranoia with regular reports to the White
House highlighting the communist influence within the B.E.F.

It seemed that the

government was in the grip of a "red scare," convinced that the Great Depression had
created conditions that made the country vulnerable to a threat from the left. The arrival
of the Bonus Army intensified these fears among many in Washington, and created a
potentially volatile situation. 96
Many of Virginia's newspapers bit hard on the supposed communist infiltration of
the B.E.F. story. Across the state papers warned
the veterans not to allow the "reds' to manipulate
them, and warned that the use of force may be
necessary if the B.E.F. couldn't purge its ranks of
communists.

In Richmond, the Times-Dispatch

didn't want "harm to come to anyone," but
warned the veterans that they must cleanse
themselves of all radicals and not become ''the
dupes of communists" if they wanted to avoid a

Figure
6:
One
Virginia
newspaper 's take on the men in
Washington; are they really
veterans, or just trying to appear
so?
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confrontation. 97 Two days later it cautioned the
veterans again not to become the "dupes" of the
communist "shock troops" in their midst. 98 The
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Lynchburg Daily Advance contended in three editorials that the veterans were losing
control of their protest to groups of communists, and that they had better do something
about it before the government did. 99
Newspapers weren't the only source of red baiting in Virginia. Elites from all
sectors of society jumped on the red bandwagon, perhaps none more prominent than
General Billy Mitchell.

General Mitchell had pioneered the use of military aircraft

during and after World War I, and had been famously court-martialed for embarrassing
the Navy by sinking capital ships with torpedo planes in a post-war demonstration during
which he deliberately disobeyed direct orders to limit the size of the bombs his planes
dropped. 100 By 1932 he had been mostly vindicated in his views on the utility of military
aircraft, and was living in Middleburg, Virginia, about 50 miles outside Washington. His
status gave him access to the Governor, and he used it to blast away at what he was sure
was a communist plot to overthrow the federal government. General Mitchell assured
Governor Pollard that he understood, through his contacts in the American Legion and
the Army, that the entire Bonus March was planned and directed by the Communist Party
in New York. Phase one of their plan, Mitchell claimed, was to march on Washington
under the Bonus Certificate pretense with the goal of being forcibly thrown out, while
phase two would establish a national movement with the goal of toppling the federal
government, funds for which were being provided by the Soviet Union. Mitchell urged
Pollard to therefore take a hard line with the veterans, prevent them from "squatting" in
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Virginia, and be vigilant in countering the communistic drumbeat that was sure to
accompany phase two of their plan to bring down the govemment. 101
The government and the press needn't have worried about a communist
revolution, at least not from the veterans in Washington. There were communists in the
ranks of the B.E.F., but their numbers were small and, careful not to give the government
any reason to start anything, the B.E.F. did an exemplary job of ridding itself of
communist agitators throughout the Bonus March. From the very beginning, Walter
Waters went out of his way to assure the authorities that the B.E.F. would not tolerate
communists in their midst, then put out orders to his men to tum any communists out of
their ranks aggressively. Told by Chief Glassford that they were welcome in Washington
as long as they behaved like gentlemen and didn't mix with communists, one Bonus
Marcher replied that "if we find any 'red' agitators we'll take care of them ourselves." 102
Take care of them they did.

Suspected communists were tried by B.E.F. courts for

spreading communist literature and whipped as a result, denied rations and shelter, and
some even suspected a couple of communists fished out of the Potomac had been beaten
to death by Bonus March~rs. 103 Virginia's own veterans took their cue from the larger
Bonus Army and did whatever they could to discourage any association with
communists. At their very first meeting in Richmond, R.J. Pacini from the V.F.W.
addressed the men and warned them against mixing with any communists they might
encounter in Washington. Calling them the "greatest threat to our country at the present
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time," Pacini encouraged the Richmonders to "just bust them in the nose" if approached
by communists.

104

Veterans passing through the state echoed those sentiments.

In

Roanoke reporters discovered that no "red" talk was being tolerated by a group of 500
veterans from Texas and Oklahoma, and they had just expelled two of their own in
Memphis for engaging in exactly that. 105

Again and again, transient veterans and

recruiters were asked by reporters about the communist presence in their ranks, only to be
told, as Ben Miller told the Richmond Times-Dispatch while selling copies of the B.E.F.
News in Richmond, "we allow no 'reds' around our camps." 106 No amount of hard

evidence could ever convince the government or Virginia's press that what Miller
asserted was true. Convinced there was a threat which simply didn't exist, at least not on
the scale it imagined, Washington inched closer and closer to confronting the B.E.F.
Americans' fear of communists and nationwide racial tensions would continue for
decades after the Bonus Army was largely forgotten, until the end of the Cold War and
the passage of civil rights legislation drove those fears to the back burner or underground.
Although it may have hurt their cause in the short run, the demographics of the B.E.F.
may have borne unintended fruit as well. If nothing else, the Bonus Army would force
some thoughtful Virginians to consider the injustice of Jim Crow and perhaps their own
hypocrisy. Whatever some white Virginians thought of the African-Americans in their
midst, black veterans had no doubt where they stood, or at least intended to stand. Later,
as the Bonus Army was being routed from downtown Washington by American troops, a

104

"Local Veterans Leave Today," Richmond Times-Dispatch, l l June 1932, p. l.
Roanoke Times, l l June 1932, p. l.
106
"B.E.F. News Sold in City," Richmond Times-Dispatch, l 9 July 1932, p. 5.
105

49

black veteran, badly stabbed in the melee, plainly stated what any Virginian veteran,
white or black, on the wrong side of U.S. Army bayonets would have felt when he
exclaimed "I may not be an American, but I'm a Virginian." 107

107
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Chapter 6: "Until We Change The Minds of These Guys"

On 15 June 1932, the House voted 209-176 in favor of paying the Soldiers' Bonus
immediately and entirely. Of Virginia's ten Congressmen only Representative John W.
Flannagan of the

9th

District (Bristol), who had also signed the veterans' petition pulling

the bill out of committee, voted in favor. In Richmond, the News Leader was proud that
no other state voted against the bill with so large a percentage of its strength, but was
nonetheless "humiliated" by the single "yes" vote of Representative Flannagan. Indeed,
the News Leader urged its readers to remove him and any other pro-bonus politicians
from office at the earliest opportunity. 108

The Richmond Times-Dispatch urged

Virginians to be proud of the votes of their Representatives, and assured its readers that
the bill would not pass in the Senate. 109 The Lynchburg Daily Advance blasted the House
for "passing the buck" to the Senate, and hoped the Senate would not do the same thing
to the President. 110 In Norfolk, the Virginian-Pilot scolded the House for taking action
that would only encourage other disgruntled groups to travel to Washington to march for
their myriad causes and, confident that the veterans would disperse as soon as their
legislation was killed, urged the Senate to "get on with the execution."

111

Although the

Roanoke Times was disappointed in the House, it was so certain that the Senate would
vote the Patman Bill down that it began to write about the Bonus March in the past tense,
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blaming the entire affair on politicians who encouraged the veterans to travel to
Washington for a bonus they never had any chance of actually rcceiving. 112
Three days later the Senate took up the Patman Bill. Already working past the
end of the current Congressional tenn, it would be the last act of the

72nd

Congress.

While thousands of veterans kept vigil on the Capitol la\\TI, Senators debated into the
night, not entirely certain what the B.E.F. would do if they voted against the bonus. At
9:30 P.M. word was sent to Walter Waters that the Senate had defeated the bill 62-18,
with 16 not voting. 113 Senator Carter Glass (D-VA) voted against the bill, while Senator
Claude Swanson (D-V A) did not vote but was paired against the bill, as he was attending
the Geneva Annament Limitation Conference at the request of President Hoover, and
therefore had the good fortune, according to the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, of being "three
thousand miles removed from Washington's unholy mess." 114 While stunned veterans
absorbed the news outside, frightened senators made good their escapes through
underground tunnels so as not to face the crowd or be in the building if the veterans
should stonn it, though nothing of the sort happened. 115
Virginia's newspapers unanimously cheered the results of the vote in the Senate.
The Lynchburg Daily Advance congratulated the Senate for taking a "courageous stand''
by removing another obstacle to comprehensive economic recovery, while at the same
time congratulating the B.E.F. for the manner in which it "received the blow."

116
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Richmond Times-Dispatch suggested that the Senate's vote was a stinging rebuke of the
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House of Representatives, and that even responsible Bonus Marchers would look back
one day with no pride on their protest and recognize the Senate had done the right thing
by the nation. 117

The Richmond News Leader thought the six-year terms Senators

enjoyed made it easier for them to stand up to special interests, and suggested that the
nation might look at longer terms for Representatives in order to "stiffen the backbone"
of that chamber as well. 118 The Farmville Herald was just happy to see the current
Congressional session finally come to an end. Disgusted with the overall performance of
this particular Congress, the Herald suggested it would be forever known "for bad
legislation that failed, rather than for good legislation which passed," no doubt referring
in part to the Patman Bill which was the final piece of "bad legislation" to fail. 119
In the wake of the Senate's rejection of the Patman Bill, Virginia began to grapple
with the problem of what to do with potentially thousands of veterans stranded within her
borders. Most veterans had no more means of getting home than they had to get to
Washington in the first place. Assuming, as most did, that the B.E.F. would disintegrate
shortly after the "no" vote in the Senate, Virginia State Adjutant General S. Gardner
Waller rushed to Washington to meet with officials there regarding how best to ensure
the veterans did not linger long in the area. Washington Police Chief Glassford told him
that the District would transport veterans to the Virginia and Maryland borders, and
suggested that Virginia supply trucks to take them from there, stating that Maryland had
already agreed to do so. This Waller refused to do, explaining that the distances in
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Virginia were much greater than those in Maryland, making the cost of transporting
thousands of men across his state far too high. No evidence is available that Waller ever
requested assistance from the federal government in moving veterans through Virginia.
At one point Waller suggested that he may have to appeal to citizens to carry veterans a
couple at a time through Virginia in their private automobiles. Lacking the funds or
vehicles to do anything else, he waited to see what developed and hoped the numbers of
men traveling home through his state would be low. 120
Waller needn't have worried too much about plans to move the veterans because,
to the surprise of most observers, the veterans had decided they weren't going anywhere.
While the morning after the vote in the Senate the Richmond Times-Dispatch called the
pursuit of immediate payment a "dead issue" and declared that the veterans were now
"retracing their steps homeward," nothing could have been further from the truth. 121 The
very next day the Richmond News leader observed that few if any veterans had been
seen passing through Richmond on their way home as expected, and railroad officials had
not yet been inundated with veterans riding their trains. 122 Although many did leave
Washington after the Senate vote, Walter Waters immediately announced that the entire
B.E.F. intended to stay "until we change the minds of these guys," until 1945 if
necessary, when their bonuses were legally due to be paid.

123

While many veterans gave

up hope and started for home, the bulk of them stayed on, including most of the
Richmond contingent. Joined by a second wave of 35 Richmond veterans two days after
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the first group arrived, by early July Virginia's veterans had moved from their initial
camp located at Congress Heights to 4 Yi Street and Main Avenue. Their choice of
location not only put them outside Anacostia, but placed· them away from the main
concentration of veterans in the city located along Pennsylvania Avenue between the
White House and the Capitol, where clashes with police in the coming days would soon
initiate the veterans' expulsion from Washington. 124 The Virginians' location placed
them adjacent to the old U.S. Army War College, before it was moved to Pennsylvania,
where ironically officers were probably in the midst of discussions about how to suppress
the very protest taking place outside their gates.
Shortly after settling on 4 Yi Street the Virginians moved for a second and final
time to Camp Bartlett, just outside the District borders east of Camps Marks and Sims at
Anacostia. Camp Bartlett was named after John H. Bartlett, a former Governor of New
Hampshire who was sympathetic to the veterans' cause. Bartlett owned some wooded
land in a secluded area just outside the District of Columbia and donated it to Walter
Waters for use as a B.E.F. camp. In what would become home to 1,200 veterans, Camp
Bartlett was one of the more civilized bonus camps, with Army tents, electricity, and a
couple of kitchens. 125 In addition to having many comforts lacking in other B.E.F.
camps, Camp Bartlett promised to be something of a safe haven for the veterans should
things turn confrontational between the Bonus Army and the government, since it was
both outside the District of Columbia and on private land. While the camp's location
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meant a longer walk for veterans to get to the center of the action at the Capitol, its
comfortable facilities and supposed safety were probably worth the trouble for many.
An indication of the necessities as well as the boredom of camp life can be seen in

the list of items the Richmonders requested through the Times-Dispatch on at least two
occasions: "blankets, cots, clothing, shoes, cigarettes, pipe and chewing tobacco,
matches, magazines, boxing gloves, checker boards and any other games," as well as
plenty of food and money. 126 The proximity of Virginia's veterans to their home state
meant that supplies from home were plentiful compared to those from further away, so
much so that Walter Waters began to centralize collection of all donations in order to
distribute the goods evenly across the entire B.E.F. This had the unintended side effect of
encouraging Virginians and others in nearby states to stop sending donations altogether
"if (their) own boys can't keep it!" 127
The Richmond B.E.F. was constantly looking to secure additional men as well as
supplies.

B.E.F. recruiters scoured Richmond, Hopewell, Petersburg, and the

surrounding area throughout June and July, looking for veterans to join the Richmond
contingent at Camp Bartlett. 128 An indication of Virginia's proximity and importance to
the B.E.F. may have been that the very first of many recruiters that Waters sent out after
the Senate vote was a Wisconsin woman he dispatched to Richmond. 129 Their efforts
seem to have only seldom paid dividends. Some citizens claimed the veterans were
recruiting not only other veterans, but any unemployed men as well. In early July a
126
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single truckload of recruits for the Richmond B.E.F. left town for Camp Bartlett. It was
the only documented example of success in their recruiting drive, and it couldn't have
included more than 30 to 40 veterans. 130
One important member of the Richmond B.E.F. was no longer with the outfit after
the Senate vote. By 22 June C.C. Grotz, previously 2nd in command, had been elevated
to commander of the Richmond B.E.F. 131 Thomas B. Dove is named as the commander
by the Times-Dispatch as late as 13 June, which placed him with the unit in Alexandria,
about to move to Congress Heights. It is clear, then, that Dove was not part of the initial
100 or so Richmonders who slipped away after the setback with rail transportation on the
first night, and that he made the trip north. On 15 and 18 June the House and Senate
voted on the Patman Bill, and by 22 June Grotz is confirmed to be in charge, making it
likely that Dove was one of the many who went home dejected after the Senate voted
down the bonus. It is possible that something more dramatic happened, that he was
forced out or otherwise resigned as a result of some incident, but the total lack of
newspaper coverage accounting for the change in leadership seems to support a less
remarkable exit.

At any rate, given his previously-mentioned perceptible lack of

leadership ability, it was probably no great loss.
As the camps in and around Washington grew ever larger, the health implications
of their existence began to concern Virginia's State Health Commissioner Dr. Warren F.
Draper. Comparing the conditions of the various camps to those at Camp Thomas at
Chickamauga during the Spanish American War where 15 percent of the assigned
130
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soldiers developed typhoid fever, Draper urged Virginian veterans to stay away from the
camps "unless they should feel the urge of a real duty." 132 Sanitation was every bit as
bad as Draper feared. Flies, mosquitoes, garbage in the streets, and hasty latrines created
appalling conditions. Food was mishandled and improperly stored, was not always fully
cooked, and was eaten with filthy hands off makeshift plates passed from veteran to
veteran. Many rummaged through trash heaps looking for anything to build shelter with,
some lived with no shelter at all, and clothes were washed and men bathed in the river. 133
Dr. Draper wasn't the only one concerned about the unhealthy conditions in the
veterans' camps.

The day after Draper's warning the Lynchburg Daily Advance

completely agreed with him, urging Virginia's veterans to heed the doctor's advice and
not travel to Washington, and took his warning a step further. The Daily Advance wasn't
only worried about the health of the men in the camps, but was starting to think about the
implications for the state if thousands of sick men eventually had to pass through the
small towns of Virginia on their way home, spreading disease throughout. 134 A few days
later the federal government began to address some of Virginia's concerns by opening a
field hospital for ill Bonus Marchers at Fort Hunt, south of Alexandria. At a cost of
$10,000, it had 46 beds and stocked more food than most Bonus Marchers could probably
imagine. As of 18 June there were only twelve men admitted, and the epidemic that

. he B.E.F. camps never matena
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The B.E.F. was competing for attention with a lot of news items in the summer of
1932. Virginia's papers were dominated with Hitler's rise in Germany, the debate on
prohibition, the Democratic Convention in Chicago, the kidnapping and murder of
Charles Lindbergh's son, and a reunion of Confederate veterans in Richmond. Despite
the busy news season, Virginians were extremely interested in the veterans' march to
their north. Besides the coverage they received on the front pages and editorial sections
of Virginia's newspaper, the veterans published their own newspaper, the B.E.F. News,
which was sold throughout Northern Virginia and on the streets of Richmond. By July
1932 circulation of the veterans' paper had reached 100,000 copies a week. 136
The University of Virginia's Institute on Public Affairs was interested enough in
the Bonus March to commission a round table event on the topic of unemployment, and
invited B.E.F. Commander Walter Waters to address the forum. 137 Waters accepted, but
on 11 July it was his Chief of Staff, Captain Doak E. Carter, who appeared in
Charlottesville. Carter told the panel that the veterans were not in Washington to secure
immediate payment of the bonus, but rather to guard American institutions from
communists or any other group threatening to overthrow the government.

The

Lynchburg Daily Advance pointed out that it surely would have come as a shock to the
25,000 men flying banners demanding payment of their bonus that their real purpose was
not to receive their money at all, but rather to protect the government that wasn't giving it
to them. 138
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As June gave way to July and the B.E.F. continued to linger in Washington,
Virginia's press called loudly and often for the veterans to return home. From the day the
Senate defeated the Patman Resolution until the Army evicted them from Washington,
the Richmond Times-Dispatch called on the veterans to disperse no fewer than six times
in editorials entitled "A Dead Issue," "This Should End It," "Time to Demobilize,"
"Veterans Go Home!," "No Time for Bluster," and "A Bonus Concession."

When

Confederate veterans met for a reunion in Richmond that summer, the Roanoke Times
recounted the hardships those men endured upon returning home from the Civil War and
commented that "no man waited for a bonus, or expected anything of an act of
Congress." The veterans of an older war, they thought, had something to teach the
veterans of a newer one. 139 The Lynchburg Daily Advance, feeling that the veterans were
only adding to their suffering by staying in their dilapidated camps long after all hope of
securing their money had faded away, urged them to disband. 140 Letters to the Editor
occasionally added to the chorus of voices demanding an end to the Bonus March, such
as one particularly angry letter to the Richmond Times-Dispatch from A Virginia Voter,
who claimed the federal government could learn from Mussolini, who had just had two
would-be-assassins executed: "Stop molly-coddling. Stop nursing men who are enemies

.
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to our country. Arrest the Ieaders o f t his group ... put t em m Jal 1.

The Roanoke Times' admiration for the veterans of the Civil War may shed some
light on the mood of the Commonwealth towards the entire adjusted compensation issue.
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Right in the middle of the Bonus March in Washington, Confederate veterans gathered in
Richmond and struck a dramatic contrast to the veterans in Washington.

Most of

Virginia's Civil War veterans would have been content with nothing but victory in their
war, yet this new breed of soldier, victorious in their war, demanded money in addition to
victory. For many Virginians it probably went to the heart of what military service
should be in a free republic. It was supposed to be the soldier's honor to serve, not the
nation's honor to have the soldier. Sure, veterans were hurting, but in the middle of the
Great Depression everyone was suffering, and the World War I veterans surely didn't
think the current economic conditions were worse than those Virginia's Civil War
veterans experienced.

Consider too that after the Civil War the federal government

granted pensions to Northern veterans as early as 1862, but left Southern veterans to their
individual states. 142 Virginia didn't offer its veterans pensions until 1888, and then at
much lower rates than in the North. 143 Later efforts to incorporate Confederate veterans
into the United States pension system were unsuccessful, which only pushed Virginians
further away from Washington. One is left to wonder if two distinct military cultures
emerged from the Civil War: one that took victory for granted and expected veterans to
be well compensated, the other that hoped for victory and expected little material help
win or lose.

If that be the case, it could be a partial explanation of how the

preponderance of the national press might .be sympathetic to the Bonus Army, yet
Virginians might have nothing but disdain for it.
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Chapter 7: Exit Strategies

Virginia's newspaper editorial boards weren't the only ones who thought it might
be time for the veterans to return home. As Jennings C. Wise had discovered, many in
the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F. were beginning to feel the same way. Wise was
an Army officer, lawyer, and author who in the summer of 1932 was associated with the
law firm of Dunn, Anderson, and Dunn in Washington, D.C. As a native Virginian, he
made it his business to seek out his fellow Virginian veterans when they came to town for
their bonus. What he discovered was that many of the Virginians wanted to return home,
but didn't do so for lack of transportation and food. Wise became convinced that if one
group started for home, others would follow their lead, until eventually the whole of the
B.E.F. had departed from the city. Determined that it should be the Virginians that led
the way, Wise contacted his old acquaintance, Governor Pollard. Wise and Pollard had
worked together previously at the firm of Pollard, Wise, and Chichester in Richmond.
Wise hoped that he might call upon that previous association to secure the Governor's
cooperation with his plan. In a phone call to the Governor in early July, Wise explained
that he had met the Richmond contingent in Washington and that they had asked him to
serve as their commander. 144 This is entirely plausible, as Wise was a Virginian and had
himself served as a Lieutenant Colonel in the A.E.F. during the war, and the time frame
roughly coincides with the disappearance of Thomas Dove as the Virginians'
commander. Wise claimed he turned them down, yet began to build up support within
the ranks of the Richmond contingent for dissolution of the B.E.F.
144
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Wise contacted the Governor by phone to propose a course of action while the
latter was attending the Democratic National Convention in Chicago.

Wise briefed

Pollard on the growing discontent in the Richmond contingent, informed him that he had
taken the liberty of arranging press coverage of the Virginians' retreat with the
Associated and United Press, and asked the Governor for transportation and provisions
for the veterans. Judging by the tone of a letter of explanation Wise later sent Pollard, the
conversation did not go well.

Whatever Wise's intentions, Pollard seems to have

suspected they were self-serving, and may have told him as much, because Wise sought
to assure Pollard after the fact that his only motive was to help bring the Bonus March to
a conclusion, and that his actions had "no political implications as far as (he) was
concerned." 145 From Pollard's perspective, Wise's initiative probably risked making the
Governor look a bit indecisive by comparison, particularly because Wise had already laid
on press coverage, and Pollard would therefore not have the opportunity to influence the
story. By endorsing Wise's plan at this late stage Pollard risked allowing real leadership
to be demonstrated by someone other than himself, triumphantly concluding the most
vexing problem facing the national government at the moment.
Since Governor Pollard declined Wise's request, an opportunity for the
Commonwealth of Virginia to bring the Bonus March to a peaceful conclusion was
missed. Still, even if he agreed to provide trucks and food, Wise's plan may have come
to nothing. Two days after Wise contacted Pollard in Chicago, Walter Waters and the
rest of the leadership of the Bonus Army learned about the planned exodus of the
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Virginians.

Waters moved quickly to crush the revolt by sending men among the

Richmond contingent threatening violence should they break ranks. In the face of these
threats and absent any support from their home state the men complied, and the Bonus
March dragged on into the summer toward what kind of resolution nobody knew.
As the Bonus March wore on into July, the federal government began to look for
some way to bring the affair to a conclusion. Recognizing that wishing the veterans away
wouldn't make it so, on 7 July Congress authorized payment of $100,000 to Bonus
Marchers to pay their way home. Although the payout would count against the value of
the Bonus Certificate of any veteran who accepted, the Richmond Times-Dispatch still
thought it regrettable that this money, which might have been better used to ease
suffering elsewhere, should be spent on the veterans. Nevertheless, it acknowledged that
Congress had to do something to remove them from Washington, and strongly urged all
Bonus Marchers to take the money and go home. 146
General Glassford, who was forever touring the B.E.F. camps on his motorcycle
to check on the men and oversee the distribution of supplies, also urged veterans to
accept the government-provided tickets and return home. Glassford worked the crowd
himself, but also treated the veterans to concerts by military bands, whose programs were
designed to remind the men of home and entice them to return there. Among other songs
from all parts of the country, "Carry Me Back to Old Virginny" was a regular part of any
concert in the veterans' camps. 147 By 11 July, 1,100 veterans had taken advantage of the
"free" tickets home, although just as many replacements had poured into Washington in
146
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that time, and some of those traveling home were discovered to be B.E.F. recruiters,
traveling to cities far and near to recruit additional veterans to join their ranks in
Washington. 148
Having failed to end the standoff with tickets home, the government prepared to
meet the veterans half way on their demand for full payment of the bonus. On 21 July
President Hoover signed legislation that authorized any veteran to borrow up to 50
percent of the value of their Adjusted Compensation Certificates. Previously no veteran
with a certificate less than two years old could borrow against it, and the new rules also
lowered the interest on loans from 4 Yz percent to 3 Yz percent. 149 The Richmond TimesDispatch praised the act as another in a series of concessions made to the veterans by an
extremely reasonable government and renewed its call for the veterans to take advantage
of this generosity and leave Washington. 1so A previous act of 1930 had allowed veterans
to borrow against their certificates on less liberal terms, but this new law made an
additional 4,000 Virginian veterans eligible to borrow their bonus money. The Virginian
branch of the United States Veterans Bureau estimated that those 4,000 veterans might
borrow up to $2.2 million, and prepared to issue checks immediately. 1s1 On the first day
applications were to be taken for the new loans approximately 400 Virginians applied for
and received 50 percent of the value of their Bonus Certificates, with half the total
coming from Richmond. The vast majority of applications were expected to be received
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by mail in the days that followed. 152 It was hoped that with free tickets home and half
their bonus money in their pockets, the veterans of the B.E.F. would finally disperse. If
they didn't, President Hoover's frustration was beginning to grow to the point where he
was willing to consider more radical options for dealing with the problem.
The large number of veterans who came out of the woodwork to borrow against
their certificates makes one wonder why they were not supporting their fellow veterans in
Washington. After all, Virginia only had about 300 soldiers in the Richmond B.E.F.
camp at any one time, and traveling there represented a fraction of the effort it would
have taken a veteran from the western states, given Virginia's proximity. The number of
Virginian veterans who. came forward to borrow money only serves to call attention to
the number who chose not to call on the government for immediate and full payment of
their bonus, and suggests that even Virginian veterans did not necessarily fully support
the Patman Bill.
In the midst of all this posturing and back and forth over whether the government
would provide for the veterans and whether the veterans would accept anything short of
full payment of the bonus, a seemingly inconsequential blurb was published in the
Richmond News Leader that should have given the veterans pause. On 21 July, the paper

reported that a shipment of tear gas guns and grenades had left Pittsburgh for
153
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Chapter 8: Plan \Vhitc
Blockaded in the White House by thousands of veterans and fearing a growing
perception of weakness during an election year, by the middle of July President Hoover
had had quite enough of the Bonus Marchers. Inundated with intelligence reports that
insisted the Bonus Army was teeming with radicals, and having tried and failed to pay
their travel expenses home and loan them half of their bonus money to placate them,
Hoover determined to use force instead. Unwilling to wait any longer for a compromise
solution, Hoover ordered the District Police to evict the veterans from the buildings they
had occupied for two months along Pennsylvania Avenue. On 27 July, Walter Waters
was informed that his men would have to evacuate said buildings by 1 August. Waters
intended to comply, and even planned to relocate the men affected to Camp Bartlett with
John H. Bartlett's blessing, but when he appeared before them that afternoon to ask for
their cooperation the men refused to give it. If the area was to be cleared, the veterans
would have to be compelled to leave. 154
On the morning of 28 July the District Police began to clear the B.E.F. from
downtown Washington. Everything went well for the first couple hours until veterans
from outlying camps began to arrive downtown to challenge the eviction. Daniels quotes
a police officer on the scene as reporting that the B.E.F. reinforcements came from the
direction of 4

~

Street and Main Avenue, which at one time was roughly the location of

the Richmond contingent of the B.E.F., but by late July those men were out at Camp
Bartlett. Given the speed with which events unfolded, it is unlikely that the Virginians
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could have arrived downtown quickly enough to either cause or participate in the riot that
ensued. At any rate, shouts escalated to shoves, and then to thrown bricks, and finally
bullets when a District Police Officer shot and killed one Bonus Marcher and wounded a
second. 155 Once the White House became convinced that the police had lost control of
the situation, the War Department was told to clear the entire downtown of veterans
immediately.
The Army had first considered the problem of defending the city of Washington
against American civilians in the 1920s, culminating in the publication of Plan White.
Declassified in 1974, Plan White envisioned a communist rabble attempting to overthrow
the U.S. Government by force, a very real fear post-Russian Revolution and one that
corresponded with the government's characterization of the B.E.F. In the 1930s the
continental United States was divided into nine corps areas by the War Department, each
of which was responsible for monitoring "subversive activities" in its respective area.
The III Corps area included Virginia and the District of Columbia, in addition to
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and parts of West Virginia. Given its geographical area of
responsibility, the production of Plan White fell to III Corps. III Corps Commanders had
identified key industries and assets within its area of responsibility and envisioned
civilian threats to Washington as coming primarily from foreign-born radicals in the
cities of Pennsylvania and Maryland. African Americans in Richmond were mentioned
as a possible source of agitation, but were brushed aside as not posing the most likely
threat to the government. III Corps revisions of Plan White predicted that subversive
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activity would begin with an information campaign designed to undermine the loyalty of
local and federal police and military forces, followed by widespread strikes affecting
important industries, and leading finally to the seizure of strategic facilities and assets.
While III Corps had assumed disgruntled workers, and not veterans would lead any
attempt at revolution, from III Corps' prospective the Bonus March looked a lot like the
first phase of how its Plan White predicted a revolution would begin, with an information
campaign designed to shake the loyalty of government forces. 156
In accordance with the general outline of Plan White, the War Department had
been moving assets in and around Washington for two months in anticipation of the order
it now received. A Marine detachment at Quantico, Virginia, had been under orders to be
prepared to defend Washington since the second week of June. 157 Fort Myer, Virginia,
had been the site of anti-riot training since at least that early. Home to the Army's

3rd

Cavalry of which Major George S. Patton Jr. was the executive officer, the officers and
men of that famed unit had been confined to post and busy trading places as rioters and
soldiers, conducting rehearsals for what many assumed would soon be the real thing. 158
In addition to positioning and training troops, six tanks had been brought in from
Maryland and a large number of trucks had been positioned around Washington to
quickly move troops to the site of riots in the capital.
General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, took personal command
of the operation, with his aide Major Dwight D. Eisenhower at his side. Troops from
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Fort Myer, including Major Patton with his

3rd

Cavalry, trucked to Washington through

Arlington National Cemetery and assembled near the White House, while ships carrying
infantrymen from Fort Washington 18-miles downriver disembarked near the Army War
College. At 4:30 in the afternoon, shortly after the arrival of the tanks from Fort Myer,
the Army began its sweep through downtown. With bayonets fixed and gas masks on,
soldiers drove veterans from the buildings they occupied with tear gas and the stocks of
their rifles. Although some veterans threw bricks or stones, most retreated in the face of
the soldiers, and by that evening downtown Washington was mostly cleared of veterans
with no additional loss of life. 159
General MacArthur's orders were to clear downtown of veterans, and he was
specifically told not to pursue the veterans into their outlying camps. Nevertheless, after
a well executed clearing operation downtown, MacArthur moved his men to the 11th
Street Bridge opposite Anacostia and prepared to disperse the Bonus Army from their
main camp. Reminded late on the 28th by a messenger from the White House that the
President did not wish him to enter the veterans' camp, MacArthur replied that he was "at
war," and did not have time for anyone "pretending to bring orders," then ordered his
men into Anacostia. Once there his troops drove the veterans out, again making liberal
use of tear gas, expelling the men from what had been their homes. Troops then burned
the entire camp to the ground, wrapping up the operation by midnight. 160 Demonstrating
a media savvy that was second to none, MacArthur concluded his operation by preempting any presidential censure for overstepping his bounds by conducting an on-the159
160
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spot midnight press conference during which he praised the President's decision
authorizing him to rout the veterans out of their main camps, assuring the nation that had
Hoover not done so, the consequences would have been dire indeed. 161 Faced with his
General's media coup, the President could publicly call the Army Chief of Staff a liar, or
accept the responsibility MacArthur had thrust upon him. Hoover chose not to contradict
MacArthur, leaving the former to shoulder the legacy of turning bayonets on hungry men,
and the latter to develop a taste for discarding presidential orders, to both men's eventual
undoing.
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Figure 7: B.E.F. camps and the locations of Virginia 's veteran; June-July 1932.
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When the dust settled on the morning of 29 July the Richmond B.E.F. was still on
the outskirts of the District of Columbia at Camp Bartlett. Having been bypassed in the
Army's sweep of the city the night before, and billeted on private rather than federal land,
they probably felt confident that the worst was over. Late in the morning of the 29th,
however, the Army finally arrived to drive them out as well. John Henry Bartlett, owner
of the land on which Camp Bartlett was located and until that time unswerving friend to
the veterans, had unexpectedly withdrawn his permission for the B.E.F. to encamp on his
property, leading to the presence of federal troops there. 162 Shortly after agreeing to
Walter Waters' plan to evacuate Washington in favor of Camp Bartlett, John Bartlett
began to sense that the Administration would not approve. In 1932 Bartlett was President
Hoover's First Assistant Postmaster General, and after a short period of reflection he
concluded that he could not endanger his standing with the President by sheltering the
B.E.F. on his land if the President should wish otherwise. One day before the eviction,
and with no prior knowledge of what was to come, Bartlett penned a letter to Glassford
informing him that the veterans were welcome to stay on his land only so long as the
government consented. 163 Two days later the government no longer consented, and the
troops arrived on Bartlett's land. The Army quickly pushed 1,500 veterans out of Camp
Bartlett and by that evening the men of the Richmond contingent were either heading for
home or trying to find what was left of the B.E.F.
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Given the veterans' rough treatment at the hands of the Army one might expect
the Virginia press to reevaluate its position on the Bonus March. According to Paul
Dickson, co-author of The Bonus Army, most anti-bonus newspapers around the country
did just that. 165

Newspapers across Virginia, however, were nearly as hard on the

veterans as ever.

The Richmond News Leader claimed that even "habitual

sentimentalists" would not be able to make heroes of the men injured in the raid on the

28th, and that the veterans were nothing more than trespassers who never should have
been allowed in the capital in the first place. 166
Across town, the Times-Dispatch took a more
reasonable tone.

Sorry that it had come to

violence, they grieved for those whose blood had
been shed, but reiterated their support for the
government, stating that a clash had become
necessary and unavoidable, as the nation could no
longer endure defiance of the law on such a
'

scale. 167 The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot was frankly
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Figure 8:
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"inevitable, " most regretted it all
the same.
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camps, but suggested that "only time would tell." 168 In Lynchburg the Daily Advance
called the government's action "necessary," stating that the B.E.F. had been permitted to
lobby their lawmakers and lost, but implored the nation to set about to fixing the
problems that had driven these men to such desperation in the first place. 169
Charlottesville's Daily Progress regretted that the veterans hadn't been dealt with more
firmly from the beginning, as it might have made the events of 29 July unnecessary. All
things considered, however, the paper was resolute that President Hoover had acted
correctly, stating that it was "obviously (his) final duty to ... restore order." 170
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Chapter 9: Virginia's Problem Now

For the first time since the veterans began pouring through Virginia in early June,
Governor Pollard acted decisively to shape events. On the evening of 28 July, while
General MacArthur was crossing the 11th Street Bridge to bum the B.E.F. out of
Anacostia, Pollard met with State Adjutant General S. Gardner Waller and Director of the
State Motor Vehicle Division T. McCall Frazier to issue instructions for handling the
crisis. Pollard had decided that he could not allow in August a reverse of June, when
thousands of veterans had stampeded through Virginia on their way to Washington. He
therefore instructed Waller and Frazier to depart immediately for Alexandria with orders
to permit only small groups of veterans with means to transport and feed themselves to
pass through Virginia. All others were to be turned around, by force if necessary, and
sent back into the District of Columbia. 171
Waller and Frazier left Richmond that evening around midnight by car, and at 3
AM. arrived in Alexandria to convey the Governor's instructions to Arlington County
Sheriff Howard B. Fields and Alexandria Chief of Police Arnold. While Frazier was
present to ensure none of the veterans lingered in Virginia and was prepared to use every
agency at his disposal to keep them on the move, Waller remained to call out and take
charge of local units of the National Guard, should the need arise. 172 Frazier had ordered
75 of his state troopers north with tear gas and riot guns, and by 4 A.M. men were in
place guarding all of the bridges and roads that led into Virginia from Washington, with
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additional men scouring the countryside for roaming veterans who had already slipped
through. 173 It wasn't long before they found some. At 5:30 A.M. Frazier led a group of
troopers to a campsite of recently expelled Bonus Marchers just outside the Alexandria
city limits. Numbering about 350, they could have created a great deal of trouble for the
authorities, but after a short conference and a chance to eat breakfast, they formed up and
peacefully marched back into the District of Columbia. Smaller groups were rounded up
and pushed across the state line into Washington throughout the morning, and one
contingent was supplied with guides to lead them through Washington to Rockville,
Maryland, though what the authorities in Maryland thought about Virginia's authorities
barring the veterans from their own state, on the one hand, while providing guides to
escort them to Maryland, on the other, is not known. 174
By the afternoon of 29 July the worst had passed, although a final large group of
100 veterans arrived north of Alexandria at 8:30 that evening and tried to establish a
camp. Fields met them with Frazier and told them they had 24 hours to move on or be
expelled by local and state police. By 8:30 the next morning they departed to Frederick,
Maryland, and Virginia was mostly free of wayward veterans, though Governor Pollard
determined that the state police would maintain its presence in Alexandria until all the
Bonus Marchers had left Washington. By 30 July 100 state troopers were housed in the
National Guard Armory working in shifts to block all routes from Washington leading
into Virginia. The District Commissioners in Washington seem to have caught on to
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what was happening to their south by then, because that day they informed Governor
Pollard that all organized bodies would be prevented from entering the District of
Columbia unless it could be proven that their purpose was lawful. 175

By the time

Washington shut down its own borders it no longer mattered, as Pollard had completed
his coup by cleansing Virginia of veterans at Washington's expense. The next day so few
veterans were left in Virginia or attempting to enter it that the number of state troopers
present was cut from 100 to 12. Throughout the retreat from Virginia the B.E.F. was
extremely well behaved, giving authorities no cause to resort to force at any time. 176
That Pollard denied veterans safe passage through Virginia did not sit well with
everyone, and citizens were sometimes quick to let the Governor know it.

After

Washington papers carried the news that Virginia had been closed to the B.E.F., Claude
Thompson, a Virginian attorney working in Washington wrote to protest, claiming that
Virginia had always been "a place of asylum for ... people of every creed and color,"
and asked Pollard not to "cast a foul name upon her." 177 That Virginia had always been a
place of asylum for people of every color probably would have been news to the
thousands of African-American veterans being pushed out of the state along with their
white comrades. Referring to the charges that many of the veterans were communists,
F.M. Walter of McLean, Virginia, told Pollard that he might be a communist too if
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treated as badly as those men were being treated now. 178 Monroe Blake of Alexandria
sarcastically begged the Governor to allow him to keep his home. Blake understood by
Pollard's handling of the B.E.F. that his own status as' a veteran made him legally
ineligible to live any longer in the state. He submitted as a mitigating factor in his
request for an exception to this new policy the fact that his family first settled in Virginia
in 1635. As an aside, he begged for a pardon for his wife as well, "who unfortunately
served as an army nurse during the World War." 179 Pollard was either not amused or
simply didn't get the intended slight, as he replied that he "required no exemption from
any order ... to remain within our borders." 180
Although Pollard insisted in written replies to anyone who inquired that he never
prevented any veterans from traveling through Virginia, and that hundreds had done so,
he was being a little disingenuous. 181 He had allowed veterans to enter Virginia, but only
those who could pay their own way, and thereby barred the vast majority. The poorest of
the veterans were the ones who would have represented the greatest danger to the peace,
and needed exactly the kind of special handling that Pollard denied them if a riot were to
be avoided. That rioting didn't ensue is only because of the tremendous restraint shown
by the veterans, and not because of anything Virginian authorities did. The only thing
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Virginia offered the men of the B.E.F. was the threat of more force if they didn't leave
the state.
If some were upset at Governor Pollard for taking a hard line with the veterans,

others were demanding that he do so, and the chief source of their anxiety was a proposed
haven for the Bonus Army near Upperville, Virginia. Following the Bonus Army's
eviction from Washington, anyone expecting it to simply dissolve and go home was met
with the same obstinacy it had shown in June after the Senate vote. Although Walter
Waters had originally hoped to move from Washington to Camp Bartlett, when John H.
Bartlett withdrew his permission for the men to stay there he began urging the men to go
home. Most of the men, though, had no homes to go to. To some extent the B.E.F. had
given many of them purpose and meaning where previously there had been little of
either, and it was the men themselves who determined to keep the 8.E.F. together.
Wherever they went would have to be relatively close to Washington, be safe from
further confrontations with the Army, and would have to be able to provide enough land
and adequate services for up to 10,000 men. Two possibilities presented themselves in
the days after the burning of Anacostia: Mayor Eddie McCloskey of Johnstown,
Pennsylvania, declared his city to be a safe haven for the veterans, and Major L.J.H.
Herwig of Upperville, Virginia, offered the veterans his 450 acre farm. For several days
there was a very real possibility that the bulk of the Bonus Army might make Virginia
home, and the outcry throughout the state at the prospect reveals a lot about the outlook
of Virginians toward the 8.E.F. in even this, their most desperate hour.
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Major Herwig and Mayor McCloskey made their offers of assistance to the B.E.F.
immediately after their eviction from Washington, and if there was any debate between
the men of the B.E.F. about which one to accept, it was soon settled by the reality that
Virginia had closed its border while Maryland had not. Although Johnstown was further
away, they couldn't get to Upperville, so there was little choice but to move to
Pennsylvania, by way of Maryland. On 29 July 8,000 veterans began the journey to
Johnstown, and a few days later established Camp McCloskey on the outskirts of the city.
Camp McCloskey rivaled any of the camps the men had just left around Washington in
sheer squalor, and it wasn't long before the outcry from local townspeople forced
McCloskey to renege on his offer. 182 The loss of Johnstown reopened the discussion
about Upperville, as Major Herwig had made it clear as late as 5 August that his offer still
stood. With the veterans about to break camp from Johnstown, Virginians scrambled to
make sure they wouldn't end up in Upperville. 183
Virginia's newspapers had mostly moved on to other topics after the Bonus Army
was thrown out of Washington, but at least one had kept an eye on the men at Johnstown.
In Richmond, the Times~Dispatch had taken a few days to absorb the destruction ofthe
veterans' camps around Washington and was now thinking about the danger of
permitting the veterans to remain in camp, whether in Johnstown or Upperville.
Declaring that the B.E.F. was entering a radical new phase making it a threat on the order
of Hitler, they demanded that the federal government (presumably the Army) hit them
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agam, cut them off from Johnstown, scatter them for good, and use whatever force
proved necessary to do so. 184
If Virginia's newspapers had moved on, the people who were going to have to

live with the B.E.F. should it relocate to Upperville, had not. General William Mitchell
lived about eight miles away from the proposed veterans camp at Upperville, and given
his standing in the community and his previous contact with the Governor, it was natural
that he should take the lead in opposing a veterans' camp in his backyard. Mitchell wrote
to Pollard twice in the first week of August
strenuously objecting to the potential presence of a
"large group of unemployed men" staying in the
area. Mitchell urged Pollard to do everything he
could to prevent such a thing from coming to pass,
and warned that if he did not it would surely "lead
to bloodshed and violence in the end." 185 Mitchell
went on at length to highlight the communistic
origins of the B.E.F., and was convinced that they
Figure 9: General Billy Mitchell

intended to arm themselves and seize the very
reins of government if allowed to do so.

186

Less prestigious citizens wrote the Governor

as well, like Reverend James Smith, who begged Pollard to announce to the world that
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"tramp camps will not be permitted" in Virginia. 187 Thomas Atkinson was glad that his
neighbor General Mitchell had already petitioned the Governor, and wanted to add his
voice as well to ask Pollard to intervene to keep the B.E.F. out of Virginia, assuring him
that if he did not, he would surely feel "the seriousness of it in Richmond." 188 Thomas
Glascock of the Fauquier County Board of Supervisors asked for Pollard's help as well,
and brought his attention to the "health and sanitation" hazards that so many men would
bring with them to Upperville. 189 Dorsey Cullen, in addition to his previously-cited racial
objections to the presence of the veterans in Upperville, added his concern for the safety
of local women as well as the tourist industry, which he claimed was centered on hunting
and other outdoors activities, and would surely suffer should the veterans make
Upperville their home. 190
The amazing thing about Governor Pollard's responses to several of the above is
that, in every case, he asked the letter writer to keep him informed of developments near
Upperville, as though he had no access to information save that being sent to him by
random private citizens. 191

It reminds one of his reaction to the first arrival of the

veterans in June, when events seem to have outpaced the Governor.

Was it really

possible that he had so little access to basic intelligence regarding potential mass protest
events like the arrival of the veterans in June or the possibility they might establish camp
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in Virginia in August? If so. one might forgi\'e him for consistently. with the exception
of shutting do\\TI the border on 29 July. being n step behind e\'ents. Perhaps Virginia's
problem in that regard was a systems or business process problem. rather than n lack of
personal leadership from any one man; the state go\'emment of Virginia simply wasn•t
doing a \'cry good job of gathering and disseminating information. lbe fact that Pollard
was \\illing to take his intelligence where\'er he could get it would seem to suggest so.
One of the more interesting pieces of mail Go\'emor Pollard n:cci\'ed in the first
week of August came from Major llel"\ig himself. the man at the center of the storm.
who had promised the \'eterans his land in Uppcrville. Although the Alt•.mndri" Ga:ette
reported as late as 5 August that Major llem·ig·s offer still stood. that very day llel"\"ig
\\TOte Pollard to assure him that he would not tum his lnnd o\'er to the B.E.F. unless he
had the appro\'al of the Go\'emor himself. adding ..no other plnn has e\'Cr been
contemplated by me... 192 llemig had said pre\'iously that his neighbors were all ..unduly
excited .. about his offer to the Bonus Army. nnd perhaps it was because he knew he could
nc\'cr go through \\ith it.

193

Like Henry Bartlett before him. llemig couldn't persuade

himself to offer the \'eterans asylum if his go\'cmmcnt objected. whate\'er his O\\TI
con\'ictions on the matter. and so died the Bonus Marchers· last hope for refuge in
Virginia. Any lingering doubts Virginians may ha\'e had were finally put to rest when
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veterans realized that the B.E.F. had had its day and began the long journey home, and
the Bonus Army ceased to exist.
A couple of days later the Virginia Chapter of the American Legion held its
annual convention. The American Legion was first formed after World War I in order to
represent the interests of the very men who had just clamored for their money and been
answered with tear gas. If any organization should have been expected to support full
payment of the bonus, it would have been the American Legion. Across the country state
chapters of that organization were doing exactly that. 195 Well before the Virginia Chapter
met, however, its leadership had gone on record against the bonus. State Commander of
the Virginia Chapter Dr. A.T. Finch summarized his position in an editorial in which he
called upon Virginia's veterans to recognize their first obligation was to the nation, and
they must put their "selfish interests" aside. 196 It was a startling position coming from the
head of an organization whose sole purpose was to lobby for those "selfish interests,"
then let elected officials sort out what was best for the nation.
Virginian veterans of the Bonus Army had no intention of allowing the biases of
the Legion's leadership to determine the formal vote at the convention, so many of them,
freshly returned from their gassing in Washington, requested permission to address the
meeting personally. Unfortunately for the veterans only delegates, alternates, and invited
guests were permitted to speak at the convention unless two-thirds of the delegates
agreed to grant an exception. 197 No record of any speech from a Bonus Marcher to the
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Legion exists, and it is very unlikely that an invitation was issued or that two-thirds of the
delegates ever agreed to allow it. If Bonus Marchers couldn't speak on their own behalf,
there were delegates willing to do it for them, and two factions quickly emerged: one in
favor of immediate payment of the bonus and the other firmly opposed, whose ranks
again included General Mitchell. At that moment Mitchell was busy rallying support
against the proposed veterans' camp at Upperville, yet still found the time to address the
convention personally to denounce the bonus as well. 198 Colonel John A. Cutchins took
the lead of the faction opposed to immediate payment, arguing forcefully in favor of a
platform that called for leadership on national issues such as adjustment of war debts and
economy in government instead.

In its strong endorsement of Colonel Cutchins'

argument, the Richmond News Leader stated that to further the narrow interests of its
members over those of the nation would transform the Legion into a modem day
Praetorian Guard, an incendiary reference to the military guard of Roman Emperors
whose legacy was that of the power behind the throne. 199
In what the Alexandria Gazette described as "the stormiest session ever witnessed
at a State convention of the American Legion," the delegates reached a compromise
solution. 200 Unable to brush aside entirely the demands of its 18,000 members, the
Legion's leadership agreed to a platform that endorsed payment of the bonus "as soon as
the government is in a position to do so."

201

It was a resolution that gave a nod to the

rank and file members but ultimately endorsed the status quo, which was essentially the
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same as voting against immediate payment. It was the Inst word Virginia had to say on
the matter of the Soldiers· Bonus, and once again it was "nay."

Conclusion

Published 39 and 72 years after the Bonus March on Washington, respectively,

The Bonus March by Roger Daniels and The Bonus Army by Paul Dickson and Thomas
B. Allen each suggest that the nation was generally supportive of immediate payment of
the Soldiers' Bonus. A reading of Virginia's newspapers and other sources from that
summer of 1932 reveals that one of two things is probably true: either they have
misjudged the sentiment of the general public or Virginia was out of step with the rest of
the country. Like much of the nation Virginians helped feed and transport veterans to
Washington, occasionally gave them a place to sleep, and were generally sympathetic to
their plight. But while donations of food, transportation, shelter, and the like represent
sympathy for the veterans, that is very different than having sympathy for their cause, and
on the whole, and in stark contrast to the outlook of the rest of the nation, if Daniels,
Dickson, and Allen are correct, the Commonwealth of Virginia had no sympathy
whatever for the cause of the Bonus Marchers.
In every way of gauging statewide opinion measured in this study, Virginia
demonstrated firm opposition to immediate payment of the Soldiers' Bonus. Virginia's
legislators in Washington voted overwhelmingly against it, newspaper editorial boards
roundly condemned it both before and after the veterans' eviction from

Wa~hington,

Virginian towns closed themselves down at different times to the veterans, and Virginia's
own veterans generally failed to turn out to support it. Given, then, that in Virginia,
measurable sentiment towards the Soldiers' Bonus was decisively negative, whereas it
seems to have been relatively positive across the rest of the country, one must endeavor
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to find an explanation. The answer may be that, in Virginia at least, the Bonus Army was
never really just about the bonus, and it was a number of factors that had nothing
whatsoever to do with the payment of the Soldiers' Bonus that doomed Virginians'
support of it.
To many Virginians the racial integration of the B.E.F. would surely have been an
obstacle to their support. In a society governed by Jim Crow, racial integration was
unthinkable, yet here came this mass of men converging on Washington and they were
proving every day that racial integration was possible. Not only were African-Americans
included within the ranks of the B.E.F., they generally weren't segregated from white
veterans. Blacks and whites working side by side for a common political goal and doing
so publicly in the heart of the segregationist South would have been taken by many
Southerners as a stinging rebuke of their way of life, a way of life they had taken decades
to build and would not lightly see attacked. The large number of black veterans included
in the B.E.F., larger than their percentage of the original A.E.F., would have likely
cemented Southern objections to the Bonus Army, and by extension, to their cause.
The proximity of Virginia to the nation's capital meant a number of things to the
average Virginian that would have also affected his support of the B.E.F. It meant that
the number of veterans from all across the country tramping through his state was far
greater than most, with a corresponding effect on his goodwill. It meant that the site of
the protest was going to be right on Virginia's northern border, not some faraway place
only read about in the papers. Virginians had to live with the Bonus Marchers on their
doorstep for more than two months, never sure exactly what they were going to do.
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Virginia's nearness to the District of Columbia also meant that Virginians were going to
have to deal with the veterans en mass whenever the Bonus March ended. For the two
months that the Bonus March lasted, the impending return march of the veterans would
have hung over Virginians like a dangerous cloud, no one ever sure when the storm
would break or how severe it would be.
Finally, in Virginia there appears to have been a disdain, even sadness, over what
many seemed to regard as the demise of a culture of service in favor of an emerging
culture of entitlement. Able-bodied veterans demanding extra cash in exchange for past
military service, particularly at a time when the best service they could have done their
country would have been to ease the burdens on the treasury, not compound them, was
nothing short of contemptible to many Virginian writers of the time. Over and over again
in editorials, letters to the editor, and general correspondence between the most humble
citizens and the highest government officials, Virginians took exception to the notion that
the government owed the men of the B.E.F. anything. There was universal agreement
that wounded men and the families of the dead must be cared for, but there was little or
no support for providing for able-bodied men who should provide for themselves.
As well as claiming that most of the nation supported immediate payment of the
Soldiers' Bonus, The Bonus March and The Bonus Army focus on a national perspective,
as does most research on the Bonus March, and both books agree that the track record of
the leaders of the B.E.F., the federal government, and other officials and citizens was
varied. The authors' assessments include the full spectrum of performance evaluations
from the amazing insight of Pelham Glassford, to the paranoia of the U.S. Army, from
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the self-control of Walter Waters, to the tremendous generosity of average
Washingtonians.

Like the federal government, the Virginia state government had an

obligation to address the myriad problems the Bonus Army presented at its level, and like
the federal government's performance in Washington, the record of state and local
authorities in Virginia was mixed. On the one hand, authorities at the local level did a
superb job of managing a crisis of the first order, while in Richmond the state
government failed to demonstrate much leadership and struggled to develop a cohesive
policy for managing the Bonus Army in Virginia.
At the local level, small towns across Virginia banded together to move a tidal
wave of men through the state, one small town at a time, during June 1932. Authorities
had to coordinate independently with the governments of towns both before them and
after them on the veterans' route to Washington, arrange for places to bed sometimes
thousands of men at a time, and feed and transport them to the next town, all the while
protecting their own communities. They did this on their own initiative, at their own
expense, with very little information from the state or federal governments, and they did
so with a minimum of disruption to their

0\\11

people. The performance of small town

mayors, sheriffs, and relief workers was one of the great success stories of the Bonus
March in Virginia.
While local authorities across Virginia dealt with the veterans as best they could,
the government in Richmond missed a number of opportunities to influence events. At
the outset of the crisis, state authorities had an obvious duty to coordinate actions
between local authorities and provide them with the resources they needed to manage the
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stream of men moving through the state.

Yet the state provided no guidance to

subordinate governments on procedures to take, provided no transportation assets, no
funds to ease the cost of providing commercial transportation, no relief supplies, no
police assets, and no information about the movements of veterans. Chief Glassford in
Washington tried to coordinate his actions with Virginia's, but his pleas for cooperation
from Governor Pollard went mostly unanswered, and one can almost sense indifference
in Pollard's terse replies to Glassford's requests for help. Once the veterans were in
Washington Pollard missed another chance to influence events when he brushed off
Jennings Wise's suggestion to bring the Richmond contingent home from Washington,
and Pollard seemed more concerned with Wise's motives than with doing what he could
to bring the Bonus March to a conclusion. In fact, the only proactive thing that the
Governor of Virginia seems to have done throughout the Bonus March was to order the
border closed to the veterans being chased out of Washington at bayonet point by the
U.S. Army. Had he been willing, there were opportunities for him to do so much more.
The story of Virginia and the Bonus March was bound to be unique if for no other
reason than the fact that the Commonwealth bordered the District of Columbia, and
perhaps no other state had more veterans pass through its borders from April through
August of 1932. Given that distinction it shouldn't surprise anyone that Virginia's point
of view on the entire affair and the response of its government was generally unique as
well.
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